COMMENT

TROUBLES AT THE DOORSTEP: THE FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988 AND GROUP HOMES
FOR RECOVERING SUBSTANCE ABUSERS
LAURIE C. MALKININTRODUCTION
The streets are quiet and tree-lined. The homes, comfortable
and well-maintained, are encircled by green lawns and separated
either by picket fences or by driveways accommodating parked
station wagons. Children play a game of tag at one end of the
block, while mothers talk over their morning coffee at the other.
The American Dream-to live in a single family-home in suburbiaappears to be alive and well.' Is it?
Not everyone is welcome to reside in these cozy homes.
Recovering alcoholics and former drug addicts are often excluded
from this vision of the community ideal. Despite community
opposition however, increasing numbers of recovering substance
abusers are attempting to establish group homes' in single-family
residential neighborhoods.'
These democratically run houses,
4
such as Alcoholics Anonymous,
programs
self-help
modeled upon
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and for his guidance. Joel Millar, Pamela Reichlin, Andrew Schiesl, and the members
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editing. I am especially grateful to Karin Guiduli, Jeffrey Peters, Gregory Sirota,
Jessica Weiner, and Lisa Winsheimer for their encouragement. This Comment is
dedicated to my family, with love.
I For a similar depiction, see Steve Mitra, Home Stands Alone; Housefor Recovering
Addicts Is Opposed By Neighbors, Officials, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 6, 1991, at 1
(describing the perception of East Farmingdale, N.Y., residents who attempted to
prevent the establishment of a group home for recovering substance abusers).
2 These living arrangements are described herein as either group homes or
recovery houses.
s Oxford House, the nation's largest provider of group homes for recovering
substance abusers, has grown from one home in 1975 to 534 homes in 36 states and
the District of Columbia in 1994. See H.Jane Lehman, Supreme Court to HearCase on
Group Homes: Oxford House Challenges Limits on Residents As Discriminatory, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1994, at El, E5.

4 SeeJ. PAUL MOLLOY, SELF-RUN,

SELF-SUPPORTED HOUSES FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
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have contributed to the effective rehabilitation of former drug and
alcohol abusers. 5 Recovery houses for former substance abusers are
similar to group residences for the elderly, the mentally and
physically disabled, AIDS patients, and troubled teenagers in that
they serve individuals struggling to develop healthier, more stable,
independent lifestyles.'
Shared living arrangements located in
residential neighborhoods succeed because they provide the right
environment.7 Furnishing former addicts, a population desperately
in need of safe, affordable housing,8 with a structured and supportive milieu, however, evokes immense local opposition.
Resistance to group homes for recovering substance abusers
takes many forms and varies in intensity. Local opposition to these
and similar programs has ranged from signed petitions 9 to acts of
arson'" but is most often manifested by the use of municipal
zoning laws. By requiring special permits," invoking public notice

RECOVERY FROM ALCOHOL AND DRUG ADDICTION 7 (Alcohol, Drug Abuse & Mental
Health Admin. Technical Assistance Publication Servs. No. 5, 1992).
s See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the success rates of grouphome programs).
6
See Cindy L. Soper, Note, The FairHousing Act Amendments of 1988. New Zoning
Rulesfor Group Homesfor the Handicapped,37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1040-41 (1993)
(stating that the general goal of group homes is to help residents "become
contributing members of society"); see also Kay Kusumoto, Home Gives HelpingHand
to Addicts, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at B 1 (explaining how the purpose of Oxford
House is to provide former addicts with sufficient support to discourage relapse and
to integrate them into the community).
7 See David C. Bell et al., An Experimental Test of Retention in Residential and
Outpatient Programs, 20 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 331, 338-39 (1994)
(suggesting that a correlation exists between the close social relationships afforded
by residential programs and effective drug treatment); see also MOLLOY, supranote 4,
at 16 (commenting that houses located in good neighborhoods provide additional
incentives for recovering addicts to remain clean and sober).
' See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing the need for affordable,
stable, appropriate housing for former substance abusers in light of the close
relationship between addiction and homelessness).
'See, e.g., ChillingHUD Complaint: The Wrong Way to Battle NeighborhoodActivists,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at A6 (editorial) (noting that more than 75 people
signed a petition opposing the establishment of a group home for poor women
recovering from drug or alcohol problems).
"0See Letta Tayler & Estelle Lander, Arson Target: Planned Northport Home for
Mentally Retarded Damaged,NEWSDAY (N.Y.),June 9, 1992, at 3, 109 (describing how
a group home was damaged by apparent arson after nearly 40 residents voiced their
opposition to the home at a village board meeting and noting that the fire was the
fifth instance of arson in a group home on Long Island, N.Y.), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
" See, e.g., United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994)
(compelling an Oxford House to participate in a special-use permitting process before
the local zoning board as a prerequisite to suing the municipality under the Fair
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requirements, 1 2 and employing restrictive definitions that limit
access to single-family residential neighborhoods,13 communities
are frequently able to block the development of such residences.
At first glance, some of this protest seems reasonable. Many
people work and save for years so that they can move into their own
home. Purchasing a house is often a family's single largest
expenditure. 4 Furthermore, a home in a single-family residential
neighborhood means more than the almighty dollar. 5 People
move to these neighborhoods to escape crime, drugs, and similar
social ills. They seek out communities that share their values and
interests. To members of these neighborhoods, it seems inconsistent at best and" dangerous at worst to welcome into their midst
houses full of former drug addicts and alcoholics.
Many courts have shared, or at least accommodated, this exclusionary perspective." Even those courts that do find exclusionary
practices to exist sometimes inadequately assess and redress
Housing Act).
2
See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (describing a zoning ordinance that requires both public notice and
hearings prior to group-home approval).
"sSee, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1993)
(permitting a city to require a rezoning hearing for Alzheimer's patients who sought
to enter a neighborhood zoned solely for single-family homes); Elliott v. City of
Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 983-84 (11th Cir.) (denying the zoning request of an Oxford
House because the home exceeded the permitted maximum-occupancy limit), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992).
14See, e.g., Walker Builders, Inc. v. Lykens, 628 So. 2d 923, 924 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993) ("The purchase of a home is the largest single investment that the average
American family will make."); Hoke v. Beck, 587 N.E.2d 4, 7 (111. App. Ct. 1992) ("In
many cases, the purchase of a home is the most important investment of a lifetime
'....
); Calvert v. K. Hovnanian at Galloway, VI, Inc., 607 A.2d 156, 162 (NJ. 1992)
("For many people the purchase of a home will be the most significant financial
transaction they will ever undertake."); Garcia v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm'n,
775 P.2d 1308, 1314 (N.M. Ct. App.) ("For many people, the purchase of a home is
the largest investment they will make."), cert. denied, 776 P.2d 846 (N.M. 1989); Maack
v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he
purchase of a home is often the single largest investment an individual or family will
make ..... ).

"5See, e.g., Salka v. Dean Homes, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 910 (Ct. App.) ("[T]he
purchase of a home is not only the largest investment most people make in their
lifetime, it is also a highly personal choice concerning how and where one lives his
or her life.").
" See generally United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir.
1994) (vacating a preliminary injunction against a zoning restriction that limited the
number of residents in a group home); Smith &Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 933 (reversing
a district court's finding of intentional discrimination in the denial of a zoning
request that would have allowed a group home to increase its number of residents).
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community efforts to discriminate against group homes from singlefamily residential neighborhoods. 17 By viewing neighborhood
zoning issues as the distinct domain of the locality, by failing to
recognize the need for proactive measures, and by refusing to look
beyond narrow conceptions of the family, courts allow persistent
discrimination. This inadequate judicial enforcement forces former
substance abusers who lack local power to battle against firmly
entrenched community structures and stereotypes. Too frequently,
former substance abusers lose this struggle between community
interests and individual rights.
Despite extensive community opposition and insufficientjudicial
enforcement, group homes for former alcohol abusers and drug
addicts should be accepted in single-family residential areas and
should be accommodated by local zoning laws. This issue is
certainly one that, in the most literal sense, will hit some readers
close to home. The claim that former drug addicts and alcoholics
must be allowed to reside in group homes situated in communities
that they choose is not only controversial, but is often met with a
visceral response.
This Comment provides a reasoned alternative to such resistance. Part I explains precisely why it is essential that homes in
single-family residential neighborhoods be available to groups of
former substance abusers. It briefly describes the magnitude of the
drug and alcohol problem and demonstrates how group homes
provide a necessary and effective step toward addiction recovery.
Indeed, it is not only appropriate to integrate group homes for
recovering substance abusers into single-family residential communities-it is the law.
Part II examines the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
(FHAA)' s and includes explanations of its basic provisions, the
legislative intent that motivated its passage, and the methods of
stating a claim thereunder. The FHAA enunciates a solid congressional policy regarding the rights of recovering substance
abusers: (1) housing discrimination against people with disabilities
is unlawful;19 (2) recovering alcoholics and former drug addicts are
" See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995)
(narrowly addressing the issue whether a zoning regulation limiting occupancy to five
or fewer unrelated persons was a use limit or a total occupancy limit).
18 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604-3631

(1988)).
19See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (stating that "it shall be unlawful... [t]o discriminate in
the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer
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to be considered people with disabilities; 20 and (3) discrimination
against recovering substance abusers may be manifested in many
ways, including intentional acts, unintended effects, and a failure to
reasonably accommodate rules and practices, even when they are
necessary to afford equal housing opportunity. 2' The scope of the
statute is sweeping, not only in the broad protections it affords, but
also in the limited exceptions it allows.
The problem of community opposition to group homes for
former addicts and inadequate judicial enforcement of the FHAA
is outlined in Part III. This section first considers the "why" and
"how" of municipal efforts to exclude houses for recovering
substance abusers from single-family residential neighborhoods. It
then describes how the judicial system has failed to address this
problem. Courts often ignore clear congressional intent when
interpreting the FHAA. As a result, discrimination against former
drug addicts and alcoholics persists. The judicial system's reluctance has been most pronounced in its interpretation of the FHAA's
definition of "reasonable accommodations." 22 Part IV concludes
the analysis of fair housing rights of group homes for recovering
substance abusers. It recommends an alternative application of the
FHAA, one that embodies the true intent of Congress and sufficiently combats discrimination against group homes for former drug
addicts and recovering alcoholics.

or renter because of a handicap").
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (providing a broad definition of "handicap"); see also
infra part II.A.2. Although the distinction is significant and the nature of both terms
problematic, this Comment will employ interchangeably the terms "disability" and
"handicap." See Penn Lerblance, Legal RedressforDisabilityDiscrimination:Bob, Caro
Ted and Alice EncounterAIDS, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 307, 328 n.66 (1994)
(discussing statutory uses of the terms "disability" and "handicap"). Congress
replaced the term "handicap" with the term "disability" in its definition of statutorily
protected persons when it passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. This
change resulted from complaints that use of the word "handicap" helped to
perpetuate stereotypes and patronizing attitudes toward such persons. See Preamble
to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A (1994) (analyzing definitions found in
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1995)).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (delineating the forms of discrimination covered by
the FHAA); see also infra part II.B (describing the prima facie case for proving an
FHAA violation).
' See infra part III.B (discussingjudicial analysis of the "reasonable accommodations" clause).
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I. GROUP HOMES AND ADDICTION RECOVERY
Communities may not always welcome group homes for
recovering substance abusers, but they cannot dispute the fact that
these programs work. The record on recovery houses is clearexperts, participants, and legislators agree that this mode of
rehabilitation markedly improves individuals' abilities to free
themselves from addiction and to meaningfully contribute to
society.2" Given the magnitude and staggering consequences of
America's substance abuse problem, steadfast support of this highly
effective recovery program is imperative.
A. Why Group Homes for Recovering Substance
Abusers Are Needed
Group homes for recovering substance abusers are necessary to
combat the detrimental effects of drug abuse and alcohol dependence. Despite the War on Drugs and a national movement to stem
alcohol abuse, the incidence of addiction in America remains
staggeringly high.24 Yet numbers tell only a fragment of the story.
25 See Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 456 n.1l
(D.NJ. 1992) (describing the testimony of Oxford House residents who found that
the program makes "the difference of night and day" and the opinion of substance
abuse experts who believe this living arrangement fosters community reintegration);
Lawmakers Concerned over Implementation of Recovey Home Program: Group Homes for

Recovering Alcoholics and Drug Abusers, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WK., Apr. 26,

1989, at 3,3 [hereinafter Lawmakers] (referring to ajoint letter written by four House
members in support of the Oxford House model in which they explained that
Congress "selected Oxford House as a model because of its considerable success in
reducing the rates of recidivism and in promoting long-term recovery"), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; see also Kusumoto, supra note 6, at BI (recounting
the experience of one Oxford House resident who was able to prevent a relapse into
drug addiction by participating in the program).
2 The 1994 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse recently estimated that
18 million drinkers and 5 million drug abusers need treatment. See Abigail Trafford,
Winners and Losers: A Look at the Past Ten Years, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1995, Health,
at 8, 13. Indeed, a recent comprehensive national survey on illicit drug use found
that 13 million Americans, or 6.2% of the population, use illicit drugs. See Marijuana
Use By Teens Rises Sharply, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1995, at A8; see also Vital Statistics:
Impact of Alcohol on American Lives, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1991, Health, at 5
(discussing a study conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics that found
that 43% of the 177 million adults over age 18 were found to have been exposed to
alcoholism in some way); cf. NORMAN K. DENZIN, THE RECOVERING ALCOHOLIC 17
(1987) (noting that in 1985 Alcoholics Anonymous counted a worldwide membership
of over 1.2 million persons). But cf. KENNETHJ. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS,
ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY 105 (1994) (discussing alternative methods of

measuring drug usage and the difficulty of obtaining reliable results).
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Addiction unquestionably places a tremendous strain on our
communities. Crime and drug dependence seem inextricably
linked.25 Substance abuse drains public resources and causes
diminished workforce productivity. 6 Furthermore, the correlation
between substance abuse and public welfare problems is sufficiently
profound to warrant aggressive policy action.
Additional socioeconomic ramifications of drug and alcohol use
are equally profound. First, substance abuse jeopardizes both
physical and mental health,27 resulting in a more fragile population
and contributing to rising health-care costs." Second, addiction
2

Homicide, assault, theft, and child abuse and neglect are all closely connected

to drug use. See, e.g., 1 COMMITTEE FOR THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE COVERAGE STUDY,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS 102 (Dean R. Gerstein & Henrick

J. Harwood eds., 1990) (conservatively estimating that in 1986 9 million crimes,
causing $1.7 billion in personal losses and $2.6 billion in property losses, were
attributable to the drugabuse of the offenders); Rich Connell, The HiddenDevastation
of Crack, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al, A18-A20 (citing an extensive array of
recent statistics indicating greater incidence of random violence, high rates of arrest
for drug possession, overcrowding of jails, and an increase in public costs for the
maintenance of the children ofcrack addicts);see alsoJiang Yu & William R. Williford,
Alohol OtherDrugsand Criminality: A StructuralAnalysis, 20 AM.J. DRUG & ALCOHOL
ABUSE 373,388 (1994) (finding that alcohol and cocaine use tends to increase involvement in criminal activities). See generally MICHAEL D. LYMAN, NARCOTICS AND CRIME

CONTROL 159 (1987) ("It is no secret that a definitive, but complex correlation exists
between drug crimes and other types of crime.").
26 See e.g., Marci M. DeLancey, Creatinga Successful Drug-Free Workplace Program,
EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAYJune 22, 1995, at 53, 53 (reporting that the annual cost of
drug abuse to the business community is estimated to exceed $75 billion, with losses
in productivity alone amounting to $7.2 billion for drug abuse and $33 billion for
alcohol abuse (citing MARCI M. DELANCEY, INSTITUTE FOR A DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE,
DOES DRUG TESTING WORK? (1994))), availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File;
see also 1 COMMITTEE FOR THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE COVERAGE STUDY, supra note 25, at
103 ("Crime career and incarceration losses to the economy were $12.2 and $5.4
billion in 1986, which arise from significant commitments to crime career endeavors
by 1.1 million persons and the incarceration of 200,000 persons on drug charges or
drug-related offenses." (citation omitted)); id. (suggesting that the largest cost
attributable to drug abuse may be reduced productivity among the work force,
although
acknowledging the complexity of making such estimates).
27
See CHARLES B. RANGEL, HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., ON THE EDGE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SOCIAL

AND ECONOMIC PROFILE IN 1992, at 1-2 (Comm. Print 1992) (stating that drug-related
emergencies in hospitals increased from 26% to 31%); William Claiborne, Substance
Abusers Among Welfare's Young Mothers, WASH. POST, June 28, 1994, at A3 (citing a
report by Columbia University's Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse that
estimated "that Medicaid inpatient hospital costs of birth complications due to
substance abuse could reach $4 billion [in 1994]"); see also Mitchell S. Rosenthal, The
Therapeutic Community: Exploring the Boundaries, 84 BRIT. J. ADDICTION 141, 148
(1989)
(discussing increasing evidence of drug use among psychiatric admissions).
2
See, e.g., Connell, supra note 25, at A18-A20 (estimating that treatment of
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and homelessness are closely connected." Third, substance abuse
encourages dependency in other ways, including dependency on
other people and on public benefits programs."0 Finally, on a less
tangible level, drug and alcohol addiction signifies a loss of
traditional values 3 1 and perpetuates a deep-seated sense of wide32
spread social disorder.

A distinct lack of adequate, effective rehabilitation programs
exacerbates the enormity of the substance abuse problem. Although
one recent estimate by experts suggests that approximately twentythree million Americans require treatment for drug and alcohol
abuse, our nation can treat only 800,000 annually.3 3 Among the

prenatal crack exposure can cost $8000 to $20,000 in the least severe cases and
estimating the cost for the treatment of one premature crack baby at $75,000 to
$100,000).
2'9 A 1988 survey of Oxford House residents found that nearly 40% reported that
they had been homeless, half of whom had been homeless for periods of six months
or more. See MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. G at 3. In another survey, 68% of homeless
men and 32% to 38% of homeless women surveyed were found to be probable or
definite alcoholics. See William R. Breakey et al., Health andMental Health Problems
of Homeless Men and Women in Baltimore, 262JAMA 1352, 1355 (1989). Although the
statistics were somewhat lower for narcotic addiction, one additional inquiry found
that more than half of the subjects had used drugs at least occasionally and that 22%
of homeless men and 17% of homeless women qualified as drug abusers. See id. This
same survey also identified 56% of men and 17% of women as having alcoholdependence syndrome, a more severe condition. See id.
" See, e.g., Connell, supra note 25, at A19 (describing one woman's dependence
on publicly funded drug treatment centers and state-run foster care services).
31See, e.g., Sam H. Verhovek, Powell Deftly Deflecting Questions on Presidency, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at A12 (quoting General Colin Powell as saying that he believes
that most social ills, including drug abuse, are caused by a lack of traditional family
values); see also Kathy Lauer-Williams, Action Against DrugAbuse Urged, MORNING CALL
(Allentown),June 20, 1995, at B5 (quoting the Executive Director of the Philadelphia
Anti-Drug, Anti-Violence Network as citing the lack of spiritual and family values as
part of the reason for increasing substance abuse), availablein LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
2 See Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 147-48 ("Drug abuse is plainly both a cause and
an effect of widespread social disorder. ... Where there is drug abuse, there is
invariably other disordered behavior. Where other disordered behavior exists, so
does drug abuse.").
"SSee Trafford, supra note 24, at 13; see also Gina Kolata, Twins of the Streets:
Homelessness and Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1989, at Al (noting that in 1989,
there were 50,000 to 100,000 homeless people in Los Angeles County but only 20 or
25 beds available to them in residential treatment programs and describing an
addict's experience of trying to get clean only to receive the 397th slot on a waiting
list for a program); Elizabeth Shogren, CisnerosAsks StrongerFedera4 PrivateEfforts to
Aid U.S. Homeless, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1993, at A7 (citing a shortage of drug treatment
facilities as a reason for homelessness). See generally 1 COMMITtEE FOR THE
SUBSTANCE ABUSE COVERAGE STUDY, supra note 25, at 76-104 (studying the need for
drug treatment in the criminal justice system and among household and homeless
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general population of addicts, eighty percent of those in treatment
relapse. In contrast, those who live in group homes for recovering
substance abusers are highly likely to achieve their goal of sobriety.
Among group home residents, eighty percent remain clean and
3 4
sober.
Residential treatment significantly reduces the incidence of
crime and other social ills."
It may, in fact, save money by
reducing the social costs of drug use. One expert recently testified
before a Senate Committee that
[v]irtually all economic measures show that the burden of crime
and other economic consequences of drug abuse are lower after
treatment than before. Costs of drug abuse to law abiding citizens
populations in the years 1987 and 1988).
" See FairHousing. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Judiciaty, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(statement ofJ. Paul Molloy, Chief Executive Officer, Oxford House, Inc.), available
in Westlaw, USTestimony database, 1994 WL 530652 [hereinafter Fair Housing
Testimony]; see also William H. Spillane & Dean F. Ahern, Catholic University of
America, Final Report: Developmental Exploratory Study of Six Newly Formed
Group Recovery Homes 55 (Feb. 15, 1991), cited in Herbert A. Eastman, Waron Drugs
or on Drug Users? Drug Treatment and the NIMBY Syndrome, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15,
29 n.23 (1994).
5
See Michael T. French et al., The Effects of Time in Drug Abuse Treatment and
Employment on Posttreatment Drug Use and Criminal Activity, 19 AM. J. DRUG &
ALCOHOL ABUSE 19, 31 (1993) (finding a "negative, statistically significant, and stable
effect on Posttreatment Drug Use and Criminal Behavior Indexes" for individuals
enrolled in the treatment); id. (finding in the same study "that residential clients
always showed the greatest relative improvement in drug use and criminal activity
from additional time in treatment").
In one recent study, the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
followed more than 1800 people discharged from treatment programs in California
between October 1991 and September 1992, a population carefully selected to
represent a cross section of the 150,000 people who received treatment that year in
California. Researchers concluded that substance abuse treatment programs do help
to reduce crime and lower health-care costs, saving taxpayers millions of dollars. For
the $209 million that state residents invested in chemical dependency treatment
during the year, taxpayers saved approximately $1.5 billion-a return of seven dollars
for every one dollar spent in treatment. See Daniel J. Anderson, Savings Outweigh
Treatment Costs, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 14, 1995, at 7E; Michael Darcy, Push
Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 1994, § 1, at 12 (discussing the California study and
reporting that in 1994 treatment cost $2234 per person, whereas one year of
incarceration cost $39,600 and one year of untreated addiction cost $43,200); see also
Larry Gostin, The Interconnected Epidemics of Drug Dependency and AIDS, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113, 164-66, 175 (1991) (describing how effective treatment of
alcohol and drug abuse improves psychological adjustment, increases employment,
and reduces crime and other forms of antisocial behavior (citing V. TABBUSH, THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF PUBLICLY FUNDED DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT AND
PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA: A BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS (1986))).
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fall by about 20%, costs to victims decline by about 30%, criminal
justice costs fall about 24% and the costs of theft fall about
11%.s6

These statistics provide only a glimmer of the cost-effectiveness
of community living programs for drug addicts and alcoholics.
First, group homes for recovering substance abusers do not cost the

federal government much money. A typical project receives one
small, short-term, start-up loan from the federal government,
amounting to no more than $4000.s7 Thereafter, it remains
a wholly self-run, self-supporting entity. 8 Second, such programs
address the continued plight of homelessness. The link between
substance abuse and homelessness cannot be underestimated. In

Philadelphia, for example, a recent survey found that eighty to
ninety percent of homeless single adults are addicted to drugs or

" CapitolHillHearingTestimony: Ellen M. Weber Co-Directorof NationalPolicy Legal
Action Center Senate Labor Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
Reauthorization,Federal Document Clearing House Congressional TestimonyJuly 27,
1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File; see also id. (noting that "on
average, untreated alcoholics incur general health-care costs that are at least 100%
higher than those of nonalcoholics," but that treatment of addiction reduces days lost
to illness, sickness claims, and hospitalizations by approximately 50%); Capitol Hill
Hearing Testimony: Hon. Lee P. Brown Director Office of National Drug Control Policy
House Appropriations Treasury, Postal Service and General Government FY96 Treasury,
PostalAppropriations,Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony,
Mar. 28, 1995 (discussing a 1994 study of drug treatment in California that found that
every dollar spent on drug treatment translates into seven dollars saved in crime and
healthcare costs), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
A similar study found tHat for 10,000 individuals receiving addiction treatment
during a five-year period, treatment returned to society almost the entire financial
outlay: the costs to society were reduced by 8%; the costs to victims of drug-related
crime were reduced by about 30%; the costs to the criminal justice system were
reduced by about 24%; and the costs to victims of theft were reduced by 11%. See
John E. Franklin ct al., Barriers to the Implementation of a Programfor Inner-City,
Homeless SubstanceAbusers on GeneralAssistance: Newark, ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q.,
No. 3/4, 1993, at 65, 66 (citing R. HUBBARD ET AL., DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT: A
NATIONAL STUDY OF EFFECTIVENESS (1989)).
s See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
s See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S5998-99 (daily ed. May 16, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Cranston) (explaining that a group home for veterans with mental disabilities
and substance abuse problems would be inexpensive because the program, after
start-up costs, would be paid for by the patients involved through their work
under contracts that the Veterans' Administration would make with outside
businesses).
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alcohol. 9 Nationally, forty-three percent of the urban homeless
are substance abusers.40
Safe, affordable housing in drug-free environments is difficult
to find, and often nonexistent.4 1 Experts have noted that although
drug-free housing is an essential component of any effective drug
treatment program, "[o]ne of the chief obstacles to successful
community care of individuals ... has been the lack of adequate,
affordable housing." 42 Indeed, it is more difficult for recovering
substance abusers to find adequate housing in drug- and alcoholfree environments after a rehabilitation program than it is to get
into a rehabilitation program itself 43 In light of this housing
shortage for recovering addicts and the massive potential costs
exacted by continued substance abuse and future treatment,
supporting programs that provide less44 expensive, more effective
rehabilitation is even more important.
"' See Steven R. Paisner, Comment, Compassion, Politics, and the ProblemsLying on
Our Sidewalks: A Legislative Approachfor Cities to Address Homelessness, 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 1259, 1266 n.4 9 (1994) (citing Don Klingerman, Fairmount Capital Advisors,
Presentation to the Mayor's Commission on Homelessness, City of Philadelphia (May
20, 41993)).
oSee Bruce Alpert, Morial Homeless on Rise in N.O., TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Dec. 20, 1994, at BI (discussing the first report by the U.S. Conference of
Mayors on hunger and homelessness in America).
4, See Brian E. Mavis et al., TreatmentNeeds and Outcomes of Two Subtypes of Homeless
Persons Who Abuse Substances, 44 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1185-87
(1993) (comparing housed and homeless substance abusers, finding that the problems
of the homeless clients were more pervasive, chronic, and severe, and suggesting that
supportive housing may help prevent clients from returning to the streets and
resuming their drug habits).
42 Otto F. Wahl, Community Impact of Group Homes for Mentally Ill Adults, 29
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTHJ. 247,248 (1993) (noting that this is especially true for
people living on disability incomes who often "find themselves limited to run-down
apartments in the most crime-ridden, pest infested parts of their cities, to barren
overcrowded shelters, or to the streets as part of ... 'the homeless'" (citation
omitted)); cf FRANCES L. RANDOLPH ET AL., IN SEARCH OF HOUSING: CREATIVE
APPROACHES TO FINANCING INTEGRATED HOUSING 1-2, 5 (1987) (finding that despite
a widespread recognition of homelessness among those persons with psychiatric
disabilities, one of the largest gaps in community support systems is the lack of
affordable housing that is available on a long-term basis and that is linked to services
and supports).
" See Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation and Other Groups
Listed on Inside Cover As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents pt. IV.A, City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (No. 94-23), available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
4 SeeJames M. Raczynski et al., Comparing Two Substance Abuse Treatmentsfor the
Homeless: The BirminghamProject,ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q., No. 3/4, 1993, at 217,
231 (describing how drug-free housing not only creates suitable homes, but provides
greater opportunity for vocational training and paid work experience, provides a
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B. How Group Homes for Recovering
Substance Abusers Work
The theory behind group homes for recovering substance
abusers is simple: "[A]ddicted individuals can help themselves by
helping each other abstain from alcohol and drug use one day at a
time for a long enough time to permit a new set of values to be
substituted for the values of a lifestyle in which alcohol and drugs
were used."45 Programs that use this model work because the
environment that they provide balances the needs for constant
46
support, community integration, and independence.
The therapeutic aspects of the group-home concept are indeed
manifold, providing the basis for successful treatment and the
resources for self-reliance. At the core of this model is the
fundamental notion that initial treatment, frequently referred to as
"detox," is not the end but the beginning of the alcoholic's or drug
addict's recovery.4 Substance abusers frequently lack the independent living skills, communication abilities sense of responsibility,
48
self-esteem, and independence necessary to make it on their own.

source of immediate success experience that serves to increase self-esteem, and
rewards people who continue their recovery, because only those who remain drugfree are eligible for housing).
45 MOLLOY, supra note 4, at 7; see also id. at 8 ("The basic idea [is] that one addict
is a primary source of help for another ...
46 See id. at 8.
47 As one court has commented:
[A]Icoholism and drug addiction place severe limitations on people's lives,
including disrupting personal relationships, and impairing one's ability to
advance in education or employment, and ... such limitations do not
magically disappear at the moment that abstinence begins, but rather
continue to effect a person's functioning at least through the early stages of
recovery. It is because of these limitations that recovering drug addicts and
alcoholics need to live in a supportive environment of the type that Oxford
House provides. Many witnesses testified as to the crucial importance of
this supportive and drug-free environment in ensuring that a recovering
alcoholic or addict does not relapse.
Oxford
House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,460 (D.N.J. 1992).
4
sSee, e.g., Molly Kavanaugh, Home Offers Hope for Drug-Free Life, PLAIN DEALER
(Lorain, Ohio), Jan. 4, 1993, at 4B (describing one resident's first independent
shopping excursion since ending her drug addiction and her sense of pride from this
small but important achievement); id. ("Being here is teaching me to grow up."); see
also Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1563 (E.D. Mo. 1994)
(noting that "alcoholics and drug abusers frequently have lost contact with their
families or mainstream society prior to their recovery, and may lack or have lost basic
life skills such as budgeting, arriving at work on time, maintaining employment,
cooperating with family members, and managing their own lives").
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In a group home, they are provided with the time, tools, and
support to acquire these things.
Recovery houses promote both treatment and self-reliance. On
the treatment side, this type of housing diminishes social stress and
provides a therapeutic community. 9 Residents share not only the
same living space, but make decisions together, help each other find
work, and furnish support." From a self-reliance perspective, the
group-home model relies less on the help of trained professionals,
thereby decreasing the recovering addict's role as a patient; it
focuses on normalization rather than on deviance; and it provides
a recovering substance abuser with the opportunity to obtain greater
control over his or her own environment.51 Fundamentally, group
homes for recovering substance abusers are entities based upon
faith in, and trust of, their members.52 This in turn fosters pride
and self-esteem, traits often not readily found among alcoholics and
drug abusers. 3 The benefits of this cooperative living format
make it essential to allow recovering substance abusers to live
together.
Merely providing a group setting, however, is not enough.
Housing must be located in appropriate communities for drug and
49

See Beny J. Primm, Foreword to MOLLOY, supra note 4 ("Recovery from the
disease of alcoholism or other drug addiction is often plagued by relapse .... The
self-run, self-supported recovery house provides many recoveringindividuals effective
relapse prevention because of... the support gained from living with other individuals coping with the same problem. .. .");see also Paula Goering et al., Social Networks
ofResidents in SupportiveHousing,28 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTHJ. 199, 212 (1992)
(finding that living in supportive housing arrangements has a positive influence on
residents' social networks); Michael F. Hogan & PaulJ. Carling, Normal Housing. A
Key Element of a Supported HousingApproachfor People with PsychiatricDisabilities,28
CoMMuNrY MENTAL HEALTH J. 215, 222 (1992) (explaining that a stable, positive
quality of life keeps stress levels manageable and facilitates a positive, stable lifestyle).
s' See 137 CONG. REC. S6000 (daily ed. May 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston)
(noting that the group home structure allows "individuals in recovery the opportunity
to determine their own living environments;... [provides] a supportive environment
free of alcohol or drug use; and... reinstills pride and self-esteem").
51For example, recovery houses usually recommend participation in other selfhelp programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") or Narcotics Anonymous
("NA"). See MOLLOY, supra note 4, at 26-27 (noting that although Oxford Houses do
not hold AA or NA meetings on the premises, members tend to average about six
meetings each week). See generally Hogan & Carling, supranote 49, at 216 (criticizing
the overemphasis on "special needs" and encouraging integrated, supported housing);
Kenneth L. Robey, Group 11ome Residents' Identities As Patients and As Community
Members, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYHIATRY 58, 58 (1994) (studying group-home
residents'
self-identification as patients and community members).
52
See 137 CONG. REC., supra note 50, at S5999.
53 See id. at S6000.
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alcohol rehabilitation to succeed. This is essential for many reasons.
First, because recovering substance abusers are trying to reintegrate
into society, it is important that they be treated no differently than
"mainstream" community members.
Recognizing that former
addicts have the same concerns as others who seek housing is
therefore imperative. Like anyone looking for a new place to live,
a person in recovery wants a home, not merely housing. A former
addict wants self-determination, the opportunity to decide for
herself where to live. 4 This choice not only promotes dignity, it
also fosters responsibility and independence, thereby furthering the
former addict's rehabilitation.
Second, living in single-family areas has been found to be a
necessary component of group housing for former drug addicts and
alcoholics. Fear resulting from decreased safety and poor living
conditions as well as social isolation hinders recovery;5 5 whereas
proximity to public transportation, employment, recreational
opportunities, and shopping directly promotes it.5" Recent studies
repeatedly indicate that the better the neighborhood, the better the
chances that addicts will recover. A United States General Accounting Office survey found that safe, stable neighborhoods with high
percentages of single-family residences create the best opportunity
for recovery."' Likewise, middle- to higher-income communities
improve the chances of social adjustment, more effectively promote
community integration, and provide better resources. 8 As one

" This is the position advocated by proponents of "supported housing." "'People
should be given the opportunity to actively participate in the selection of their
housing arrangements from among those living environments available to the general
public.'" Hogan & Carling, supra note 49, at 216 (quoting the National Association
of State Mental Health Program Directors' position statement on housing and support
for people with long-term mental illness).
" People who live in isolated or poor neighborhoods with high crime rates generally have little contact with their community. See MartinJaffe & Thomas P. Smith,
Siting Group Homes for Developmentally Disabled Persons 8 (1986). Furthermore,
it is extraordinarily difficult, if not altogether impossible for group-home residents
to create a proper home life when they are forced to live in commercial or industrial
neighborhoods. See Daniel Lauber & Frank S. Bangs, Jr., American Society of
Planning Officials, Zoning for Family and Group Care Facilities 8, 10 (Mar. 1974).
' See Hogan & Carling, supra note 49, at 224 ("A housing location proximate to
public transportation, employment, recreational opportunities.., and so forth will
make it easier for consumers to control and direct these aspects of their lives. These
opportunities for control facilitate learning of practical living skills, and may reduce
dependency .... ").
5

7 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER
PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY
DISABLED app. at 8 (1983).

" SeeJohn T. Hull &Joy C. Thompson, Factors Which Contributeto Normalization
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expert noted, "the prevailing opinion among alcohol and drug
professionals [is] that the key to successful treatment is to provide
social and physical environments where sobriety is positively
valued."5 9 Furthermore, because group homes play an essential
role in recovering addicts' reintegration into society and redevelopment of self-sufficiency, these homes must not be isolated from
mainstream society.6" Thus, siting group homes for recovering
substance abusers in single-family residential areas not only
increases self-esteem and independence, but also promotes
integration, thereby decreasing the potential for relapse.
The Oxford House organization best illustrates how the theory
It is not
of group homes can effectively be put into practice. 1
only the most widespread recovery house program, but it is also
tremendously successful. The national organization began with one
house in 1975, when a group of recovering alcoholics were faced
with the closing of their county-supported halfway house. Since
then, the organization has grown to more than 526 homes, located
in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia, and has helped
more than 20,000 individuals on the road to remaining clean and
62
sober.
There is no typical Oxford House resident. 63 Participants in
the program include men and women, young and old, black and

in ResidentialFacilitiesfor the Mentally Ill, 17 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTHJ. 107, 111
(1981); see also Frank Baker & Charlene Douglas, HousingEnvironmentsand Community

Adjustment of Severely Mentally Ill Persons,26 COMMUNrrY MENTAL HEALTHJ. 497,50304 (1990) (noting the "importance of the relationship between the quality and

appropriateness of housing and the clients' level of functioning").
"James D. Wright et al., The New Orleans Homeless Substance Abusers Program,
ALCOHOLiSM TREATMENT Q., No. 3/4,1993, at 51, 53; cf. Baker &Douglas, supra note
58, at 503 (arguing that when people with severe mental illness live in housing that
is physically unappealing and which by all accounts is "inappropriate," their degree
of maladaptive behavior also increases); Jean T. Turner & Thomas T.H. Wan,
Recidivism and Mental Illness: The Role of Communities, 29 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTHJ. 3, 11 (1993) (finding that living in low socioeconomic status community
is inversely correlated with recidivism for mentally ill patients).
0 See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1564 (E.D. Mo.
1994) (commenting that these houses should not be isolated in industrial neighborhoods).
"' See generally United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 355
(D.N.J. 1991) (providing a brief history of Oxford Houses and contextualizing their
significant role in substance abuse rehabilitation), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
"' See Fair Housing Testimony, supra note 34 (noting that more than 5000
recovering individuals currently live in Oxford Houses).
61 See e.g., United States v. Village of Palatine, No. 93 C 2154, 1993 WL 586699,
at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1993) (offering personal stories of some Oxford House
residents), vacated and remanded, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
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white, rich and poor, well-educated and uneducated.'
The
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Some participants, however, stay with the program only a short
time, whereas others remain significantly longer.66 Although the
goals of Oxford House may be lofty and its population diverse, the
program's rules are straightforward: Participating homes must be
run democratically; they must be financially self-supporting; and they
must immediately expel anyone who uses drugs or alcohol.67 This
supportive program with stringent rules has become a national
model. Legislators describe it as the "'missing link' in the treatment
process for alcoholism and drug addiction," 68 and courts commend
it as a "nationally recognized program which, through peer pressure
and strict conditions of abstinence, successfully maintains freedom
from addiction and improves the lives and opportunities of its
participants."6 9
Congress has twice enacted legislation encouraging the development of Oxford Houses and similarly modeled programs with the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198870 and the ADAMHA Reorganization
Act. 71 Indeed, the Group Homes for Recovering Substance

64 In terms of age composition, 29% of Oxford House residents are young adults
between the ages of 18 and 29, 41% are between the ages of 29 and 89, and 30% are
older adults. See MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. G at 1. In terms of race, Oxford House
residents are almost all primarily white or black, and they are almost equally divided
between these two categories. See id. In terms of education, a 1988 survey found that
approximately 80% of Oxford House residents have graduated from high school and
more than 30% have completed some college work. See id. at 2; see also An Oxford
Home Remedy, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 1994, at lOB (providing 1988
statistics on the racial composition of program residents and noting that Oxford
Houses are not coed, but rather provide separate houses for women and men).
' See Carey Q. Gelernter, Oxford House: Sober to Stay, SEATrLE TIMES, Apr. 17,
1994, at Ml, M5.
6 See, e.g., William H. Freivogel, West CoastCase to Affect Oxford House HavensHere,
ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1995, at 5B (describing the experiences of one
member who had been a resident of Oxford House for 31 years); cf. MOLLOY, supra
note 4, app. G at 4-5 (summarizing the results of a 1988 Oxford House survey in
which fewer than 25% of the members had been residents for less than four months).
"7 See MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. C at 19 (listing "Oxford House Traditions"); see
also Mitra, supra note 1, at 1 (detailing the rationale of Oxford Houses).
68 134 CONG. REC. E3733 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Rep. Madigan).
" Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (D.N.J.
1991).
7
See Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 2036, § 1916A, 102 Stat. 4181, 4202-03 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-4a (1988)) (establishing a program entitled Group Homes for
Recovering Substance Abusers) (repealed 1992 and superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 300x25 (Supp. V 1993)).
" Pub. L. No. 102-321, sec. 202, § 1925, 106 Stat. 323, 393-94 (1992) (codified at
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Abusers Program7 2 was an integral part of President Reagan's War
on Drugs. 73 The government has described this legislation as
providing for a "nationwide establishment of self-help recovery
housing services and a cost-effective method for many recovering
individuals to avoid relapse." 4 With the passage of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, each state became obligated to encourage the
development of such programs and to establish revolving loan funds
of at least $100,000 to mitigate group-home start-up costs. 75 States

failing to comply with the legislation can lose their eligibility for all
76
federal block grants for drug and alcohol treatment.
The timing of the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act is
particularly noteworthy." Within months of its signing, the very
same group of legislators passed the FHAA.7 ' Through the
enactment of these two laws, Congress articulated a strong, clear
public policy opposing housing discrimination on the basis of
disability and supporting the establishment of group housing for
recovering drug addicts and alcoholics.7 9 Courts have recognized
the inextricable link between these two policies. The Anti-Drug
42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993)) (reenacting the Group Homes for Recovering
Substance Abusers program).
The rules for recovery house programs established under the Act track the same,
simple, stringent rules established by Oxford House: Group homes receiving revolving loan funds must be nonprofit entities that have at least six residents; they must
prohibit the use of alcohol and illegal drugs on the premises; and they must immediately expel any person who violates this rule. See id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-4a (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993)).
s See FairHousing Testimony, supra note 34 (describing how President Reagan's
drug advisor, Dr. Ian MacDonald, was sent to visit one of the D.C. Oxford Houses);
see also Lawmakers, supra note 23, at 3 (describing the group-home initiative as "one
of the most important initiatives to result from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988"
(quoting a joint letter written to former Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Louis Sullivan, by Congressmen Dingell, Lent, Waxman, and Madigan)).
' Group Home for Recovering Substance Abusers; Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg.
15,807, 15,808 (1989).
"'See sec. 2036(a)(3), § 1916A, 102 Stat. at 4202 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x4a(a)(3)).
3
7' See sec. 20 6(a), § 1916A(a), 102 Stat. at 4202 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x4a(a)).
7 President Reagan signed the legislation on September 13, 1988, to encourage
expansion of the Oxford House model. See Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, PUB. PAPERS 1155 (Sept. 13, 1988).
s Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604-3631 (1988)).
" See MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. B ("The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988
facilitate the national goal to mass replicate the cost-effective missing link Oxford
House brings to the process of recovery from addiction to alcohol and drugs.").
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Abuse Act of 1988 and the merits of group homes are discussed in
numerous decisions that employ the FHAA to protect the housing
rights of recovering drug addicts and alcoholics." As one court
commented:
Through its enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988
and the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress has
expressed a strong public policy favoring... the establishment of
housing programs for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics.
Indeed, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's provision encouraging the
establishment of revolving loan funds by states to make start-up
loans to help establigh group homes for recovering drug addicts
and alcoholics was based specifically on the model of Oxford
House. Thus, Congress has directly endorsed Oxford House itself
as an organization worthy of public support because of its role in
helping to stem the national epidemic of alcohol and drug
81
abuse.
II.

THE HOUSING RIGHTS OF RECOVERING SUBSTANCE ABUSERS
AND THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988

Congress enacted the FHAA in large part to prohibit housing
The law was
discrimination against people with disabilities.8 2
designed to achieve two purposes: (1) to end the prejudice and
stereotyping directed toward people who have mental, physical, or
emotional impairments; and, (2) to integrate effectively this
traditionally excluded population into mainstream society."

o See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 465
(D.N.J. 1992) (concluding that the court would be "hard pressed to deny the
significance of the public interest in supporting efforts like Oxford House" in the face
of the "clear expressions of legislative support for the goal of reducing drug addiction
and alcoholism" set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the FHAA); see also
United States v. Village of Palatine, No. 93 C 2154, 1993 WL 586699, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 1993) (stating that, in accordance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, "[s]uch
houses provide an environment in which residents 'may either relearn or learn basic
life skills, responsibilities that they may not have had before, in a supportive situation
with other people who are of similar character'" (quoting trial transcript)).
Si Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 465 (citation omitted).
The FHAA addresses not only discrimination against people with disabilities,
it also prohibits discrimination based on family status, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, and
strengthens the government's ability to enforce the Act's provisions, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3610-3614.
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179.
The Fair Housing Amendments Act... is a clear pronouncement of a
national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereo-
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Inclusive in scope and short on exceptions, 4 the FHAA provides
an expansive interpretation of the term "handicapped" 5 and an
array of methods to prove housing discrimination. 6 Indeed,
Congress intended that the FHAA establish a legislative framework
capable of ending the unnecessary exclusion of former drug addicts
and recovering alcoholics from communities of their choosing.
A. The Purpose and Parametersof the FHAA
With broad strokes, the 101st Congress enacted a law to protect
those who suffer from housing discrimination because of their
mental, physical, or emotional disabilities.
Recognizing the
pervasiveness of and the damage caused by such bias, Congress
passed the FHAA, s7 which amended Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act of 1968.8 Although the original legislation, passed in the wake of racial strife
and urban unrest, 9 decidedly prohibited discrimination on the
basis of color, race, religion, national origin, and gender, 90 the

types and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are specifically rejected as grounds
to justify exclusion.
Id.; see also Richard B. Simring, Note, The Impact of FederalAntidiscriminationLaws on
Housingfor People with Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413, 420 (1991)
("The FHAA seeks to achieve two goals: to secure to people with disabilities the right
to establish a home free of discrimination in any community they choose, and to
integrate people with handicaps into the mainstream of American life."); infra notes
92-94 and accompanying text (describing congressional intent in passing the FHAA).
' See infra parts II.A.1, II.C (describing the FHAA's broad definitions of
"discrimination" and "handicap" and its narrow "direct threat" and "reasonable
maximum occupancy" exceptions).
" See infra part II.A.2 (explaining how the FHAA affords protection to recovering
substance abusers).
' See infra part II.B (delineating the "intentional act," "discriminatory effect," and
"failure to reasonably accommodate" methods for proving housing discrimination).
87 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604-3631
(1988)).
" Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631

(1988)).
" See Simring, supra note 83, at 413 n.4 (noting that the original act was passed
during the civil rights movement, following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.).
o See Fair Housing Act of 1968 §§ 804-806, 82 Stat. at 83-84 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606). The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1974 to ban
housing discrimination on the basis of gender. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, sec. 808(b)(1)-(3), §§ 804-806, 88 Stat. 633, 729
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606).
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amended version went even further-it recognized that the civil
rights of people with disabilities could be protected only by
9 1
affording them equal housing opportunities.
The FHAA's prohibition against handicapped discrimination was
designed with two goals in mind: (1) to alter attitudes toward
individuals with disabilities; 92 and (2) to eradicate the manifestation of such stereotyping and bias-discrimination."
By setting
forth these goals, Congress intended to provide individuals with
disabilities the opportunity to become more independent and to
realize the full extent of their civil rights. The FHAA's general
purpose was emphasized by those in Congress advocating its
passage. Senator Alan Cranston noted:
Ensuring nondiscrimination in housing means ensuring an
essential element of independence and integration into the
community for disabled individuals. The right to vote, to work,
and to travel freely are all important aspects of an individual's life,
but none is more elementary than having the freedom to choose
where and how one lives. Housing is shelter-but it is much more.
It's the opportunity to be part of a community. 4
1. The FHAA Provides Expansive Protection
To promote the civil rights of people with disabilities, the FHAA
makes it unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or
renter because of a handicap." 5
Such discrimination includes:

"' See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, sec. 6, §§ 804-806, 102 Stat. at
1620-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1), 3605(a), 3606).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at I ("Prohibiting discrimination against
individuals with handicaps is a major step in changing the stereotypes that have
served to exclude them from American life. These persons have been denied housing
because of misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice."), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179; see also Simring, supra note 83, at 413 (describing the Fair
Housing Act and its 1988 amendments as laws designed "to alter people's attitudes
toward individuals with disabilities and to lift barriers to integration that communities
may put in their way").
93 See 134 CONG. REC. S10,552 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Weicker) (arguing in support of the FHAA that "[t]he major barrier faced by people
with disabilities today-discrimination-is not going to go away until we find ways to
end their segregation and isolation from the rest of society").
94 Id. at S10,556.
9 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The amended act also established more stringent
enforcement mechanisms for the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), widely expanded its coverage to reach bias based on "familial" status, and
eliminated limitations on damages and attorney's fee awards available through
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denying housing on the basis of disability; refusing to allow a
handicapped person to make reasonable modifications to existing
premises;9" and failing to design and construct multifamily dwellings in a manner accessible to the handicapped. 7 In sweeping
fashion, the FHAA requires that disabled people have access to the
full array of housing opportunities.
The FHAA goes even further by stating that the purchaser or
renter does not necessarily need to possess the disability at issue.
Any disabled person who lives with, intends to live with, or is
associated with a purchaser or renter also enjoys statutory protection." Furthermore, under § 3604(b), the FHAA makes it unlawful
for anyone to "discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith" on the
basis of a handicap. Thus, the FHAA protects both persons with
handicaps as well as entities that provide the handicapped with
housing. This includes group homes and nonprofit corporations
that promote the interests of the disabled.99
litigation. See Fair HousingAmendments Act of 1988, secs. 7-8, §§ 808,810-812, 102
Stat. at 1623-33 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608,3610-3612) (broadening HUD's ability
to enforce FHAA provisions); id. sec. 6, §§ 804-806, 102 Stat. at 1622 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606) (expanding the scope of the FHAA to discrimination based
upon familial status); id. sec. 8, § 813, 102 Stat. at 1633-34 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613) (providing that a court may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive
damages without monetary limitation, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney's
fees).
9 See § 3604(0(3) (stating that "discrimination includes... a refusal to permit,
at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be
necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises").
97
See § 3604(f)(3)(C) ("Discrimination includes.., in connection with the design
and construction of covered multifamily dwellings for first occupancy... a failure to
design and construct those dwellings in such a manner that ... the public use and
common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by
handicapped persons .... ").
98 See § 3604(f)(1)(A)-(C) ("[I]t shall be unlawful [t]o discriminate... because of
a handicap of-(A) that buyer or renter; or (B) a person residing in or intending to
reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person
associated with that buyer or renter.").
" It is well settled that a group home for recovering substance abusers has
standing to bring FHAA claims individually and on behalf of its current and potential
residents. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1572 (E.D. Mo.
1994) (holding that Oxford House had individual standing to bring an FHAA claim
because the zoning laws in dispute "perceptibly impaired" the organization by: (1)
jeopardizing its ability to perform its state contract; (2) potentially causing the failure
of the group home at issue; and (3) causing a substantial drain on Oxford House's
resources, in its role as legal advocate for recovering addicts and alcoholics); Oxford

778

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:757

Not only does the FHAA afford protection to many parties other
than those with specific handicaps, but it also includes a definition
of "handicap" that is itself extremely comprehensive. Both the Act
and its accompanying administrative regulations are deliberately
inclusive. 00
Using section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
19731 as its basis,'0 2 the FHAA defines handicap as "(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment." '°
This definition encompasses anyone who has an actual
disability, who is classified or labeled as having a disability, or who
0 4
is treated by others as possessing a disability.

House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1173-74 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
that an Oxford House's function in founding and supervising program houses gives
it sufficient interest in litigation as does the possibility of loss of state loans and
funding if the housing is closed); cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
376 (1982) (holding that fair housing "testers" have standing to bring an FHAA claim
"[a]s long as respondents have alleged distinct and palpable injuries that are 'fairly
traceable' to petitioners' actions"); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983
F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a corporation that provided
residential placements for mentally retarded persons was "an aggrieved person" for
purposes of the Fair Housing Act).
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); Preamble to Final Rule Implementing Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 24 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A, app. 1 (1995) (rejecting
recommendations that certain types of persons be specified in the definition of
"handicapped" on the basis that such additions could be viewed as restrictive rather
than as inclusive).
101Pub. L. No. 94-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988)).
102 See H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 83, at 22 ("The Committee intends that the
definition [of 'handicap'] be interpreted consistent with regulations clarifying the
meaning of the similar provision found in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."),

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183; see also 134 CONC. REC. S10,492 (daily ed.

Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (stating that the Fair Housing Act's definition of handicap is the same as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended); 134 CONG. REC. H4689 (daily ed.June, 23 1988) (statement of Rep. Pelosi)
("This act represents a particularly important step forward because it extends the
protection of the Fair Housing Act to people with disabilities. All people with
disabilities ... would be covered under the three-part definition of handicap adopted
in this bill. This three-part definition of handicap is under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .... Such coverage has been essential in section 504 and
it is critical that the bill before us extends that same protection in private housing
... ."). See generally Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The FairHousing Amend-

ments Act of 1988 and Housing DiscriminationAgainst Peoplewith MentalDisabilities,43
AM. U. L. REV. 925, 945-48 (1994) (comparing the FHAA's definition of "handicap"
to the one found in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
103 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The statute does exclude from its definition current,
illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance. For a discussion of this
limitation, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
104 Cf GARY L. ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS: REHABILITATION IN AMERICA
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2. The FHAA Protects Recovering Substance Abusers
The FHAA protects former drug addicts and alcoholics from
housing discrimination because these individuals are considered to
be people with disabilities. The FHAA does not, however, cover
current illegal drug users. 5 Whereas those who live in group
homes and who are in recovery enjoy fair housing protections, those
who continue to abuse substances, regardless of where they live, do
not.
The FHAA's definition of "handicap" is a functional one. It
does not enumerate specific conditions to categorize and determine
disabilities, but rather focuses on whether persons claiming housing
discrimination on the basis of their handicaps endure physical or
mental impairments that "substantially limit[] .. . major life activi-

ties. "106 Congress left the definition of "major life activities" to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
agency responsible for administering the FHAA.' ° HUD's parameters for interpreting the Act are extremely broad; caring for
oneself, eating, walking, breathing, learning, working, seeing,
hearing, and performing manual labor are all "major life activities."'08
The FHAA requires that any person with mental or physical
restrictions that "substantially limit[] .

..

major life activities," any

person who has a prior record of being so impaired, and even any
person merely perceived or treated by others as having such
limitations be defined as "handicapped."" 9 This inclusive ap18-23 (1992) (commenting on the ambiguity that accompanies definitions of disability
and discussing various interpretations).
105The

relevant portion of the FHAA states: "'Handicap' ...

does not include

current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
'- See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); see also Patricia E. Salkin & John M. Armentano, The
FairHousing Ac4 Zoning and Affordable Housing, 25 URB. LAW. 893, 894 (1993)
(explaining the FHAA definition of "handicap"); William Graham, Comment, There
Goes the Neighborhood: The Evolution of "Family"in Local Zoning Ordinances,9 TOURO

L. REV. 699, 724-25 (1993) (discussing the scope of the "major life activities" clause);
cf. Simring, supra note 83, at 423-28 (agreeing that the FHAA employs a functional
approach in defining "major life activities" but questioning the vague boundaries the
definition affords).
107
'o
'o

See 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1995).
See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); see also United States v. Southern Management Corp.,

955 F.2d 914, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the scope of the term "major life
activities" and its application to former substance abusers); cf. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544,
35,548-50 (1991) (implementing a similar operational definition of "disability" under

the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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proach is compatible with congressional intent. The House Report
that accompanied passage of the FHAA stated:
The Committee rejected the approach of excluding a category of
individuals with disabilities from the protection of the Act.
Instead, the Committee affirmed that all individuals with handicaps, with the exception of current illegal abusers or addicts of

controlled substances, have access to the housing protections
established by this Act. 1
Congress included recovery from drug and alcohol addiction within
the FHAA's definition of "handicap" for three reasons: (1) experts
recognize substance abuse as a disease, and therefore, a disability;"' (2) prior related legislation includes former addicts within
the definition of disability;1 2 and (3) courts consider persons in
3
recovery to be in need of protection from discrimination."1
110 H.R.

REP. No. 711,supranote 83, at 28, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189.

. See id. at 22-23 (explaining that the American Psychiatric Association, the
World Health Organization, and most other medical authorities identify addiction as
a disease), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183-84; see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 194-204 (4th ed.
1994); 1 WORLD HEALTH ORG., MANUAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, INJURIES, AND CAUSES OF DEATH items 303-304 (1977).
But cf. Frank H. Gawin & Everett H. Ellinwood, Jr., Cocaine and Other Stimulants:
Action, Abuse and Treatment, 318 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1173, 1176 (1986) (claiming that
the withdrawal symptoms produced by drugs "fluctuate and are neither constant nor
severe enough to meet psychiatric diagnostic criteria for major mood disorders").
112See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at 22 (comparing proposed FHAA
provisions to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183. The House Report suggests, in fact,
that persons recovering from substance abuse and participating in treatment and selfhelp programs should be afforded full statutory protection from discrimination in
precisely the same way as those who have disabilities that are more generally
accepted. See id. at 29 ("The formulation of this amendment parallels the provision
added to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 with regard to individuals with
contagious diseases and infections .... " (footnote omitted)), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190.
"s See. e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791,795-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that
prior addiction and drug use clearly fall within the definition of handicapped and
noting that because "[d]rug addiction is a serious public problem ..... [i]t is... not
surprising that Congress would wish to provide assistance for those who have
overcome their addiction and give some support and incentive for those who are
attempting to overcome it"); id. at 797 (determining that one of the "clear purposes"
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "is to prevent employment discrimination against
and expand employment opportunities for handicapped individuals"). See generally
Anne Robbins, Note, Employment DiscriminationAgainst Substance Abusers: The Federal
Response, 33 B.C. L. REV. 155, 169-90 (1991) (discussing judicial interpretation of
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as applied to substance abuse).
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Numerous judicial opinions have recognized Congress's intent
to afford recovering substance abusers protection from housing
discrimination, while excluding current addicts from similar
coverage. 114 The leading authority on recovering substance
abusers' rights under the FHAA is the 1992 decision, United States
v. Southern Management Corp.," 5 in which the Fourth Circuit held

that a management company's refusal to rent apartments to a
program dedicated to recovering drug addicts and alcohol abusers
violated the FHAA." 6 The court recognized Congress's explicit
focus on rehabilitation, its specific reference to drug addiction, and
its distinction between current and former users. The court
concluded that addicts are covered by the FHAA as long as they can
demonstrate that (1) they are perceived as having an impairment
and (2) they are not currently using illegal substances. 117 Later
cases have almost consistently followed suit.118 Oxford House, Inc.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 922-23
(4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the defendant's argument that because one never ceases to
be an "addict" under the medical definition, all current and former drug users are
excluded from the protections of the FHAA); United States v. Borough of Audubon,
797 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.N.J. 1991) (citing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the House Report as bases for finding Oxford House residents handicapped
within the meaning of the FHAA), afrd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
I' 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
116See id. at 923 ("Our ruling is fair notice regarding the ambit of the Act's
coverage of drug addicts/abusers. The Rehabilitation Act's current definition ...
should serve as a definitive guidepost for all future controversies under the Fair
Housing Act."). But see Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp.
450, 459-60 & n.21 (D.N.J. 1992) (including recovering substance abusers in the
definition of "handicap" but labeling the Fourth Circuit's approach a "bootstrap
argument"); ef. Robert L. Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, FightingMunicipal "Tag-Team.:
The FederalFairHousing Amendments Act and Its Use in ObtainingAccess to Housingfor
Personswith Disabilities,21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299,304-05 (1994) (analyzing methods
for defining handicap under the FHAA).
" See Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d at 922 ("The explicit focus on
successful rehabilitation and supervised programs assures us that Congress accepts
the concept of the rehabilitated addict.").
..See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802,
804 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Participation in a supervised drug rehabilitation program,
coupled with non-use, meets the definition of handicapped."), affd sub nom. City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995); cf. Stewart B. McKinney
Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1211-16 (D. Conn.
1992) (concluding that individuals with AIDS or HIV are protected under the FHAA).
Although the courts have been unwilling to broaden the current illegal substance
abuser exemption in cases involving the FHAA, a small number of recent decisions
in other disability law contexts interpret "current" as including the recent past. See
Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511,520 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, "'[c]urrent' is to be determined in light of...
whether the employee's substance abuse problem is severe and recent enough so that
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v. Township of Cherry Hill"9 provides a thorough judicial analysis
of FHAA coverage of alcoholism and drug addiction. Although its
analytical framework is slightly different from that of Southern
Management Corp., the court cites extensive expert testimony on the

"severe limitations" a history of addiction places on individuals.' 20
B. Proving an FHAA Violation

The FHAA provides a comprehensive arsenal of weapons to
combat bias against people with disabilities. Although the statute

does not explicitly state the ways to establish a housing discrimination claim, courts have employed three separate methods: proving
discriminatory intent, 12 1 proving discriminatory effect, 122 and
showing a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. 123 The
existence of such extensive methods of proof bolster the notion that

sweeping measures are needed to protect effectively the civil rights
of people with disabilities.
the employer is justified in believing that the employee is unable to perform the
essential duties of his job"); cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992); see also McDaniel v.
Mississippi Baptist Medical Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding
that a person is protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act only if he has been
in recovery long enough to become stable).
' 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992).
120See id. at 460 (discussing the obstacles of drug and alcohol rehabilitation and
explaining the "crucial importance" of the "supportive and drug-free environment"
provided by residences serving former addicts' needs).
121See, e.g., United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360-61
(D.N.J. 1991) (holding that a municipality violated the FHAA by taking actions and
making statements to prevent the siting of a group home for recovering substance
abusers), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (describing discriminatory intent under the FHAA).
" See, e.g., NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 941-42 (2d Cir.)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance limiting construction of multifamily dwellings
because it had the effect of discriminating against racial minorities), aff'd, 488 U.S.
15 (1988) (per curiam); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th
Cir. 1974) (striking down an ordinance because of its racially discriminatory effect),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); see also infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text
(discussing the discriminatory effect test).
12- See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802,
806 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a zoning ordinance was not exempt from FHAA
prohibitions because exemption would undermine the FHAA's intended purpose of
accommodating the handicapped), affid sub nom. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995). The court based its conclusion on the "reasonable
accommodations" provision of the FHAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (stating that
"discrimination includes.., a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling").
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The clearest FHAA violations involve intentional discrimination.
Under § 3604(f)(1), it is unlawful "[tlo discriminate in the sale or
rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny" a person the
housing of his or her choice because of a handicap.12 4 To determine whether intentional discrimination has occurred, courts
generally examine how the disputed actions have affected the
complaining party and the particular circumstances leading to the
claim.125 For group homes for recovering substance abusers,
statements of municipal officials and actions by local zoning boards
have sometimes, although not always, been sufficient to prove an
FHAA violation.' 26 When, for instance, a town's mayor and police
department attend a town meeting in order to develop a strategy for
harassing and discouraging those seeking to establish a group home,
27
a court is likely to find an FHAA violation.'
A second way to prove an FHAA violation is by showing a
discriminatory effect. 128 Under the discriminatory effects test, a
124 42

U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

See Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F.
Supp. 1197, 1219-20 (D. Conn. 1992) (invalidating a municipal special permit
requirement motivated, in part, by the HIV status of persons who were to live on the
property); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.
Supp. 120, 133-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (inferring intentional discrimination from the
chain of events surrounding one organization's attempt to provide housing for
homeless persons with AIDS); see also Salkin & Armentano, supra note 106, at 897-88
(discussing McKinney and Support Ministries); Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 116, at
315-18 (explaining judicial application of the FHAA).
126 See, e.g., Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1575-76 (E.D.
Mo. 1994) (finding that officials' opposition to the site of a group home for
recovering substance abusers was based upon stereotypical fears and therefore
constituted intentional discrimination). But cf. Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor,
13 F.3d 920, 927-28 (6th Cir. 1993) (overruling a district court finding of discriminatory 2intent
based upon the action of city council members and historical background).
1 7 See United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J. 1991)
(concluding that the actions and statements of local officials provided considerable
evidence of discriminatory animus), aff'd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992). But see Smith
&Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 933 (finding that an official's actions and a city's refusal to
rezone did not constitute intentional discrimination).
One recent decision indicates that an FHAA violation will not be found, however,
if local residents similarly conspire without the aid of local officials. See Michigan
Protection and Advocacy Serv. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the actions of the neighbors of a proposed group home did not constitute an
FHAA violation even with the presence of a discriminatory motive).
121See, e.g., Oxford House-C, 843 F. Supp. at 1575 (acknowledging that an FHAA
violation can be proven by showing either intentional discrimination or discriminatory
effect); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285,1294
(D. Md. 1993) ('[A] plaintiff may prevail under the FHAA by showing'discriminatory
intent,' or by showing a 'discriminatory impact.'").
125

784

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:757

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
proving that a given practice has a more detrimental impact on the
housing rights of persons with disabilities than it has on the rights
of persons without similar handicaps." 9 Under this test, proof of
discriminatory intent is unnecessary.'
Thus, in the context of
group homes for recovering substance abusers, even when they
cannot prove that city, town, or zoning board exclusion is motivated
by aversion toward them in particular, former addicts and alcoholics
may nonetheless be afforded FHAA protection.
Both the legislative history of the bill's passage and the bulk of

court analysis solidly supports use of the discriminatory effects test,
even though the FHAA is silent on its face about this method of

proof. The House Committee Report accompanying passage of the
FHAA states:
The Committee understands that housing discrimination
against handicapped persons is not limited to blatant, intentional
acts of discrimination. Acts that have the effect of causing discrimination can be just as devastating as intentional discrimination. A person using a wheelchair is just as effectively excluded
from the opportunity to live in a particular dwelling by a lack of
access into a unit and by too narrow doorways as by a posted sign
saying "No Handicapped People Allowed."''
According to the same logic, communities do not need zoning laws
that explicitly state "No Group Homes for Recovering Addicts
Allowed" in order to violate the FHAA; ordinances and procedures
that have a discriminatory impact on such programs are equally
illegal. To support use of the effects test, the House Committee
Report compares enforcement of FHAA claims with discrimination
suits brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The report cites Alexander v. Choate,'32 the seminal case endorsing
12 See e.g., Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) ("To make out
a primafaciecase under Title VIII (the Fair Housing Act), a plaintiff can show either
discriminatory treatment, or discriminatory effect alone, without proof of discriminatory intent." (citations omitted)).
1 o Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited an employer from requiring as a condition
of employment that employees possess a high school education or a passing grade on
a standardized general intelligence test, neither of which bore a demonstrable
relationship to successfuljob performance, because the Act "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation").
"3 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at 25, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186.
132469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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the use of the discriminatory impact test to prove discrimination
against disabled persons under section 504, stating, "The Supreme
Court observed that discrimination on the basis of handicap is 'most
often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thought13 3
lessness and indifference-of benign neglect."
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue whether discriminatory intent is necessary
to establish an FHAA violation, nearly all federal courts of appeals
have determined that a showing of a discriminatory effect, even in
the absence of discriminatory intent, is sufficient to establish a
violation."5 4 Indeed, courts apply the discriminatory effects test
to fair housing cases in much the same way as they do to cases
involving section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'
Although the method of proof is essentially the same in most
circuits, different appeals courts employ slightly different tests for
133 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at 25 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.

at 295), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186. In Alexander v. Choate, Tennessee
Medicaid recipients claimed that the state violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 when it reduced the annual number of inpatient hospital days Medicaid would
cover. See 469 U.S. at 289. Although the recipients lost this particular battle, see id.
at 309, the Supreme Court did suggest that proof of discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish unlawful discrimination. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
commented that "much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the
Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act
construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent." Id. at 296-97.
'" See, e.g., United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974)
(employing the discriminatory impact test in a case involving racial discrimination),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). The court in City of Blackjack explained:
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need
prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in ... discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect. The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the
action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated.
See id. at 1184-85 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (determining that
the disparate impact approach utilized in Title VII cases is fully applicable to Title
VIII claims); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (determining that although discriminatory intent was
necessary to prove a constitutional violation, such proof was not required for
establishing a prima facie FHA claim).
For a comprehensive discussion of the FHAA and the discriminatory impact test,
see generally Kanter, supra note 102, at 979-82.
1
5 See e.g., Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 981-84 (11th Cir.) (citing
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992); see also
Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1577-80 (E.D. Mo. 1994)
(discussingjudicial precedent when applying the discriminatory impact test to a case
involving a group home for recovering substance abusers).
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proving discriminatory impact. The Seventh Circuit, for example,
assesses four factors in discriminatory impact cases: (1) the strength
of the plaintiff's proof of discriminatory effect; (2) whether there is
some, although not necessarily sufficient, evidence of discriminatory
intent; (3) the defendant's interest in taking the allegedly discriminatory action; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the
defendant to provide housing or whether the plaintiff merely wishes
that the defendant refrain from interfering with individual property
owners who want to provide such housing. 3 ' The Eighth Circuit,
in United States v. City of Black Jack, 137 established a slightly different test. A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory effect. Once established, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that such conduct is necessary to promote
a sufficiently compelling interest.1 3
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit
reaffirmed the import of the effects test in this case, commenting,
"[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone" of a Fair Housing
Act claim "because clever men may easily conceal their motivations,
but more importantly, because. . . 'the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the
139
public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.'"
Although the effects test is generally accepted, not all
courts apply it willingly 4 ' and not all politicians favor its
stringent enforcement. 14' Attorney General Janet Reno, however,
IS See Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.

137 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
" See id. at 1184-85; see also Oxford House-C, 843 F. Supp. at 1577 (employing the
City of Blackjack court's test for proving discriminatory impact).
139 City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969) (en
banc)).
140 See Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94-95 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that state and municipal dispersal requirements specifically addressing
group homes did not violate the FHAA). In Familystyle, the Eighth Circuit ignored
the discriminatory impact test that it had previously announced in City of Blackjack
and instead employed a rational relationship test as articulated in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985), the appropriate standard
priorto enactment of the FHAA, when people with disabilities were not considered
a suspect class. See Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94. Using the wrong test to assess the
discriminatory impact of this dispersal requirement, the court found that the state
aim of promoting deinstitutionalizationjustified this otherwise discriminatory action.
See id. at 94-95.
141See W.John Moore, On the March Again?, 24 NAT'LJ. 2824, 2828 (1992) (commenting that although the Bush Administration attacked some types of housing
discrimination, during its tenure, the Departments ofJustice and HUD refused to
bring discriminatory-effects lawsuits). In fact, when signing the FHAA, President
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champions application of the discriminatory effect test in housing
discrimination cases, encouraging the Department of Justice to
challenge incidents of "subtle... not even conscious.., discrimination" taking the form of "bad service, indifference, ...
[and]
142
thoughtlessness."

Discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect are the two traditional methods of finding an FHAA violation. Indeed, courts and
commentators often interpret this legislation to mean that these are
1 43
the only methods of proving unlawful housing discrimination.

Reagan was far less enthusiastic than Congress and the courts about establishing
FHAA claims by proving discriminatory impact. He stated:
At the same time, I want to emphasize that this bill does not represent any
congressional or executive branch endorsement of the notion, expressed in
some judicial opinions that title 8 violations may be established by a showing
of disparate impact or discriminatory effects of a practice that is taken without discriminatory intent. Title 8 speaks only to intentional discrimination.
Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, supra note 77, at
1156.
This comment, which directly contradicted legislative history, was met by Senator
Edward Kennedy with a pointed response:
Unfortunately, President Reagan used that historic occasion to
announce an interpretation of the act that this [sic] flatly inconsistent with
Congress's understanding of the law. The President suggested that the act
should be read as requiring proof of discriminatory intent in order to
establish a violation of the fair housing law.
As the principal Senate sponsor of the 1988 act, I can state unequivocally that Congress contemplated no such intent requirement. The act did
not materially alter the 1968 Fair Housing Act provisions defining what is
required to prove a discriminatory housing practice. All of the Federal
courts of appeals that have considered the question have concluded that title
VIII should be construed, at least in some instances, to prohibit acts that
have discriminatory effects, and that there is no need to prove discriminatory intent.
134 CONG. REC. S12,449 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988).
142 Reno Approves 'DisparateImpact'forHousing Cases, DEP'T JUST. ALERT, Feb. 7,
1994, at 5; cf. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266,
18,268-70 (1994) (stating that to effectuate the FHAA, as well as the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, evidence of disparate impact, absent ajustified business necessity,
is evidence of discrimination).
14 See, e.g., Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations
and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.P.R. 1990) ("There are two methods of
showing discrimination in violation of section 3604. The first method requires a
showing of 'discriminatory intent.' ... The second method, known as 'disparate
impact' analysis, examines whether the effect of a defendant's action is unnecessarily
discriminatory even though no intent to discriminate is shown."); Salkin &
Armentano, supra note 106, at 894 ("To prove discrimination under the FHA,
plaintiffs must demonstrate either intentional discrimination, discriminatory impact,
or disparate treatment.").
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There is, however, a third alternative: the FHAA's "reasonable
accommodations" clause.
The FHAA clearly establishes that, in addition to the more traditional techniques of demonstrating civil rights violations, a disabled
person's housing rights are violated when one party fails to "make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."144 This has been
defined as "'changing some rule that is generally applicable so as to
make its burden less onerous on the handicapped individual.'" '4 5
Yet, in spite of § 3604 of the FHAA,146 which provides an explicit
statutory basis for this claim, the courts frequently rely only on the
intent and effects tests and ignore the provision allowing claimants
to bring an action for failure to provide reasonable accommodations. 147 A number of recent judicial decisions incorrectly equate
a failure to provide reasonable accommodations with a policy that
has a discriminatory effect.
In these cases, the "reasonable
accommodations" provision acts merely as an element of another
method of proof-the effects test-rather than as an independent
148
means to establish unlawful housing discrimination.
Some jurisdictions nonetheless accept the independent "reasonable accommodations" standard. In a recent case involving a city's
refusal to modify a side-yard zoning requirement, for example, one

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see also infra part IV.A (providing a thorough
evaluation of the "reasonable accommodations" clause and recommending how it
should be interpreted).
14'North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497,
499 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (quoting Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.
Supp. 450, 462 n.25 (D.N.J. 1992)); see also United States v. City of Phila., 838 F.
Supp. 223, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that the "reasonable accommodations" clause
requires cities to "'change, waive, or make exceptions in their zoning rules to afford
people with disabilities the same opportunity to housing as those who are without
disabilities'" (quoting Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of
Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992))).
4 See § 3604(f)(3)(B).
147 See infra part III.B.
141 See, e.g., City of St. Joseph v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 859 S.W.2d
723, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an aggrieved party must prove that the
city "sought to discriminate" in order to establish an FHAA violation). But see Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (E.D. Mo. 1994) ("Failure to
make reasonable accommodations is an independent Fair Housing Act violation
.... "); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (E.D. Va.
1993) ("[A] plaintiff can establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act by demonstrating either intentional discrimination or discriminatory impact, or a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations for the handicapped." (citation omitted)).
144
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district court clearly embraced this separate method of establishing
discrimination. 149 Furthermore, the only Supreme Court decision
involving FHAA coverage of group homes for recovering substance
abusers was evaluated explicitly under the "reasonable accommodations" provision. 5 ' Yet, as will be discussed in Part III, the
success of bringing a claim under § 3604, the "reasonable accommodations" provision, has been limited at best. It remains the least
to protect and enforce the
recognized, most misconstrued way
51
housing rights of disabled persons.
C. Exceptions to the FHAA

There are only a few exceptions to the broad protection
afforded under the FHAA. With regard to group homes for
recovering substance abusers, only three are particularly relevant.
First, current users of drugs and alcohol are expressly excluded
from the FHAA's protection.'5 2 Second, those who pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of others are also exempted.' 53
Third, and finally, the FHAA does not affect "reasonable local,
State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."" 4 Although these
limits on the applicability of the FHAA initially may appear to be
far-reaching, they actually provide municipalities with little ammunition to circumvent their obligations under the FHAA and combat
the establishment of group homes in their communities. Congress
construed and applied
intended that these provisions be narrowly
155
circumstances.
limited
only in specific,
149See City of Phila., 838 F. Supp. at 230 ("To read § 3604(0(3) as requiring a
showing of disparate impact-that is, a showing sufficient to establish liability under
§§ 3604(0(1) & (2)-would render § 3604(0(3) superfluous."), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d

Cir. 1994).
150 See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1779 (1995)
("Discrimination covered by the FHAA includes a refusal to make reasonable
accommodations .... ").
151See infra part IV.A (providing a detailed analysis of the "reasonable accommodations" standard).
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) ("'Handicap' ... does not include current, illegal use
of or addiction to a controlled substance .... .");supra part II.A.2 (discussingjudicial
interpretation of the FHAA's "current users" provision).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) ("Nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling
be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial
physical damage to the property of others.").
1- 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
.5See Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto, Inc., v. Suarez-Medina, 36 F.3d 177, 181
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For group homes for recovering substance abusers, the "direct
threat" and "current users" provisions, in tandem, are the most
important FHAA exemptions. They help to ensure that former
users in recovery are able to get the housing support they need
while denying current drug and alcohol abusers similar protections.
As previously discussed, although current drug and alcohol users are
not afforded FHAA protections, former addicts are. 5 ' In accord
with this distinction between those who are in recovery and those
who are not, both Congress and the courts have interpreted the
"direct threat" provision in a manner that prevents cities and towns
from using this exemption as a back-door method to exclude group
homes for recovering substance abusers.
The "direct threat" exclusion provides:
Nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made
available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy
would result in substantial physical damage to the property of
others.'57
The House Committee Report clearly indicates that it is inappropriate to uniformly exclude specific classes of otherwise eligible
handicapped persons.15 8 Indeed, the House Committee Report
states that all direct threat claims must be based upon a "history of
overt acts or current conduct" rather than on inferences based on
59
recent history or a disability.

(1st Cir. 1994) (denying an owner's claim to an exemption to the FHAA in a suit
involving a group home for persons infected with HIV, and stating that "the
presumption that ambiguous language in a remedial statute is entitled to a generous
construction consistent with its reformative mission" has been "relied on consistently
by the courts in interpreting the omnibus remedial provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, which prominently include the Fair Housing Act itself"); see also infra notes
161-70 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court has agreed with
this interpretation).
" Seesupranotes 117-20 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial interpretation
of the FHAA's "current users" provision).
157 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9).
-*8See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at 28 ("[T]he Committee affirmed that
all individuals with handicaps, with the exception of current illegal abusers or addicts
of controlled substances, have access to the housing protections established by this
Act."), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189. Indeed, the same report specifically
stated that "[g]eneralized assumption, subjective fears, and speculation are insufficient
to prove the requisite direct threat to others." Id. at 29, reprinted in 1988
at 2190.
U.S.C.C.A.N.
"I9 See id. at 29-30, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190-91.
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Courts have agreed with Congress's inclination to restrict
application of the "direct threat" provision. In United States v.
Southern Management Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that "U]ust like
any other person with a disability, such as cancer or tuberculosis,
former drug-dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling
or its inhabitants simply on the basis of status."16 This interpretation, in tandem with the limited application afforded the exclusion
for current substance abusers, indicates an unequivocal legislative
policy to afford broad housing rights to group homes for recovering
substance abusers.
If City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.16 1 is an accurate indicator of the Supreme Court's overall outlook toward the FHAA, it
seems unlikely that this scheme of broad coverage and narrow
exceptions will be easily frustrated. In this six-to-three decision, the
Court held that a Seattle suburb could not exempt a zoning
ordinance from FHAA coverage merely by labeling it a "maximum
occupancy limitation.""6 2 Although § 3607(b)(1) does provide that
"[n]othing in [the FHAA] limits the applicability of any reasonable
local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling," 63 the Court held
that this exemption did not apply to Edmonds's ordinance. Landuse restrictions that typically delineate compatible and incompatible
uses of property in categories such as single-family residential,

'6 955 F.2d 914,921 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Association of Relatives and Friends
of AIDS Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.P.R.
1990) (finding no evidence to support the conclusion that a group home for 10
terminally ill AIDS patients constituted a "direct threat" under § 3604(f)(9)); Baxter
v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 735 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that "[i]rrational
hysteria and public panic cannot support activity that violates the FHA[A] and is
clearly discriminatory"); cf. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1987)
(requiring that the decision to exclude a teacher with tuberculosis from the classroom
must be based on an individualized inquiry regarding the health and safety risk she
poses to others).
161 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
'62 See id. at 1779.

The defining provision at issue describes who may compose a family unit;
it does not prescribe "the maximum number of occupants" a dwelling unit
may house. We hold that § 3607(b)(1) does not exempt prescriptions of the
family-defining kind, i.e., provisions designed to foster the family character
of a neighborhood. Instead, § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption removes
from the FHA's scope only total occupancy limits, i.e., numerical ceilings
that serve to prevent overcrowding in living quarters.
Id.
1- 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
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multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial, ' the Court
explained, should be distinguished from maximum-occupancy
restrictions, which traditionally are based upon available floor and
room space and are devised to protect health and safety by preventing overcrowding."t 5 The exception to the FHAA described in §
3607(b)(1) applies only to the latter category. 166 Edmonds's zoning
rule, which defined "family" in a manner that limited the maximum
number of unrelated persons who could live in a single-family
residential neighborhood but which did not similarly restrict the
167
maximum number of related persons who could cohabitate,
constituted a land-use rule, rather than an occupancy limit, and
therefore was not exempt. The Court remanded the case to the
district court to determine the question whether the city of
Edmonds's actions against Oxford House violated the FHAA. 68
Much of the Court's opinion in Edmonds was premised upon an
expansive reading of the FHAA. To support the distinction between
land-use regulations and maximum-occupancy restrictions, Justice
Ginsburg discussed legislative intent at length and relied upon
principles of statutory construction that fostered liberal application
She noted the FHAA's "'broad and inclusive'
of the FHAA.
compass" and therefore accorded its enforcement provisions
"'generous construction,'"169 regarding the "case as an instance in

'

See 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (describing typical zoning restrictions).

165See id. at 1781 (stating that land-use restrictions aim to secure "'zones where

family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people'" and involve the definition of the term "family,"
whereas maximum-occupancy restrictions "ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents
of all dwelling units" and have as their purpose the prevention of overcrowding
within a dwelling (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974))); see
also id. at 1782 ("[R]ules that cap the total number of occupants in order to prevent
overcrowding of a dwelling 'plainly and unmistakably' fall within § 3607(b)(1)'s
absolute exemption from the FHA's governance; rules designed to preserve the family
character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than
on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain, do not." (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)).
1
66See id. at 1781-82 (stating that although § 3607(b)(1) "surely encompasses
maximum occupancy restrictions," its language "does not fit family composition rules
typically tied to land use restrictions"); id. at 1780 ("Congress enacted § 3607(b)(1)
against the backdrop of an evident distinction between municipal land use restrictions
and maximum occupancy restrictions.").
...
See id. at 1778-79 (citing Edmonds Community Development Code § 21.30.010
(1991), which provides that occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose
a "family" and defining family as "persons [without regard to number] related by
genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons"
(alteration in original)).
11 See id. at 1783.
69
1 Id. at 1780 (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
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which an exception to 'a general statement of policy' is sensibly read
'narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the
[policy]."'1 7 0 Although the Edmonds court construed only one
narrow provision of the FHAA, and although the Court did not
directly invalidate the discriminatory regulation at issue, the import
of the Edmonds decision should not be underestimated. Edmonds
affirms the FHAA's role in protecting from discrimination group
homes for recovering substance abusers and limits local power to
circumvent this important statute.
III. THE USE OF THE ZONING PROCESS TO EXCLUDE GROUP
HOMES FOR RECOVERING SUBSTANCE ABUSERS

A. Local Resistance to Group Homes for
Recovering Substance Abusers

For every group home that is successfully established, experts
estimate that another closes or never opens because of community
Community living programs, including those
opposition.' 71
serving individuals with mental or developmental disabilities, AIDS
sufferers, and the homeless, often meet the cry, "Not in my
backyard." 172 The opposition is everywhere-in the press 173 and
209, 212 (1972)).

17
' Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). But see id. at
1785-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disputing the premise that the case involved an
exception
to a "general statement of policy" that should be narrowly interpreted).
171

SeeJ.R. PIASECKI, HORIZON HOUSE INST. FOR RESEARCH AND DEv., COMMUNITY
RESPONSE TO NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE PSYCHOSOCIALLY DISABLED; PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1975) (finding

that 34% of residential care program directors had met with community resistance);
Richard Hogan, ManagingLocal Government Opposition to Community-Based Residential
Facilitiesfor the Mentally Disabled, 25 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 33, 36 (1989)
(surveying the response of local government officials to residential care facilities and
concluding that municipal officials expressed opposition to such programs 31% of the
time when approached by the program itself and 60% of the time when approached
by someone other than the program); Donald E. Weber, NeighborhoodEnty in Group
Home Development, 57 CHILD WELFARE 627, 637 (1978) (finding that moderate or

intensive resistance to group homes develops in roughly three out of four cases).
" See Michael Dear, Understandingand Overcoming the NIMBYSyndrome, 58J. AM.
PLAN. ASS'N 288, 288-89, 291-94 (1992) (focusing on the siting of human service
facilities in the face of local opposition and ranking levels of community opposition
by residence type). See generally MICHAEL WINERIP, 9 HIGHLAND ROAD (1994) (telling
the story of a group home for the mentally ill and detailing the vehement public
opposition to it); Malcolm Gladwell, Backlash of the Benevolent: Cities Lose Patience
Treating the Troubled at Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at Al, A18 (discussing
decreasing "civility" and increasing community exclusion in New York City).
'" See, e.g.,John Leo, A Crime If Neighbors Don't Want Addicts Next Door?,ORLANDO
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in town halls. 174 With crude political pressure and sophisticated
zoning ordinances as the weapons of choice, group homes for
175
recovering substance abusers are extremely vulnerable.
1.

Why Communities Oppose Group Homes for
Recovering Substance Abusers

People who live in the communities that oppose group homes
for recovering substance abusers generally do not hate disabled
persons and are usually glad that those with alcohol and drug
addictions want to reform themselves and contribute to society.
1 76
They just do not want such undesirables living nearby.
Vehement and pervasive local opposition to group homes for
recovering substance abusers results from fear that is very real and
very complex. Communities claim that the presence of group
homes will cause crime rates to increase and drugs to become more
prevalent.'77
They fear that group homes will make property

SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 1994, at A13 (editorial) (criticizing HUD enforcement of the
FHAA); Paul C. Roberts, Clinton Team Launches Attack on Single-Family Residential
Neighborhoods, HOUSTON CRON., Mar. 21, 1995, at A21 (describing FHAA
enforcement in single-family residential neighborhoods as extremist).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360-61
(D.N.J. 1991) (describing discriminatory statements made by local residents and
municipal officials at a town meeting regarding the zoning of an Oxford House), affl'd,
968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
175 See Dear, supra note 172, at 290 ("Concerns about personal security are more
common in response to certain client groups than to others.... Unsurprisingly,
substance abusers ... figure prominently in this category."); Phyllis Solomon,
Analyzing Opposition to Community Residential Facilitiesfor Troubled Adolescents, 62
CHILD WELFARE 361,361-62 (1983) (listing techniques used to exclude group homes).
Techniques for excluding group homes take a variety of forms. See e.g., Patrick
Cooke, Halfway Home, 5 IN HEALTH 88, 88-90 (1991) (describing opposition to a 10person group home that took the form of inflammatory posters and rumor); ForThis
Home, Sherman Street Is the Wrong Backyard, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 21, 1994,
at 96A (editorial) (opposing the siting of a group home for mentally ill substance
abusers based on crime concerns).
17" See, e.g., Louis R. Carlozo, Oxford House Wins More Time: Group Home May Open
to Residents, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 26, 1992, Neighbors, at 3, 10 (quoting the Mayor
of Cherry Hill Township, Susan Bass Levin, as saying, "I think we need to address the
problems of drug and alcohol abuse but [an Oxford House in Cherry Hill] is not the
answer"); Mitra, supra note 1, at I (quoting one town resident who opposed the siting
of an Oxford House as saying, "Why here?... This is not a neighborhood where this
belongs").
17 The biggest reason why communities oppose group homes for recovering
substance abusers is that they fear that such programs will attract crime and drugs
and, in turn, will jeopardize neighborhood children. See Solomon, supra note 175, at
364-65 (noting that the most frequently given reason for opposition in all categories
of group homes is that their residents make the neighborhood more dangerous);
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homes imperil family
values plummet, 178 and they fear that group
1 79
values and destroy community character.

When the debate is specifically focused on group homes for
recovering substance abusers, the opposition becomes especially
vehement.' 80 Yet, these concerns are unfounded. Crime and
drugs do not inundate neighborhoods that include group homes for
recovering substance abusers. 18'
Property values do not

Wahl, supra note 42, at 253-55 (classifying public perceptions of the potential impact
of group homes on communities and including in the listing the categories:
"Neighborhood crime," "Distressing incidents," "Neighborhood Appearance,"
"Resident Safety," and "Experience of Children"); see also Borough of Audubon, 797 F.
Supp. at 361 n.8 (noting the testimony of one local resident who opposed the
establishment of a group home for recovering substance abusers based on drug
concerns).
171 See, e.g., Wahl, supra note 42, at 253-54 (classifying public perceptions of the
potential impact of group homes on communities and including in this listing the
concerns: "Outside Appearance of Home," "Inside Appearance of Home," "Appearance and behavior of residents," "Neighborhood traffic," and "Property values");
Arlene Zarembka, A NeighborhoodBigEnoughforAll, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept.
19, 1994, at 3B (discussing the opposition of residents in Palatine, Illinois to the siting
of an Oxford House); see also DENISJ. BRION, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY
PHENOMENON 179-80 (1991) (describing public concern regarding the threatened
devaluation of property values).
19 See Dear, supra note 172, at 290 ("Residents worry that their enjoyment of the
neighborhood will be undermined by the clients and that certain clients will be a bad
influence on children and young people."); Solomon, supra note 175, at 364 (stating
that one reason given for opposition to group homes is that they do not belong in
family neighborhoods). This finding is supported by accounts of statements made in
public meetings, in newspaper editorials, and during interviews with local residents.
See, e.g., Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. at 359-61 (describing the discriminatory
comments made at a town meeting regarding the siting of an Oxford House); Leo,
supra note 173, at A13 (criticizing HUD for becoming involved in local zoning
disputes involving substance abusers); Mitra, supra note 1, at I ("We don't want
transients living in the community, that's all.").
180 Social scientists have ranked group homes in order of their social acceptance.
In this hierarchy, recovering substance abusers along with persons with AIDS are least
welcome. See Dear, supra note 172, at 291.
181 In principle, the FHAA denies statutory protection to current addicts and the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act and Oxford House rules strictly prohibit any and all use of
alcohol and drugs. All group homes receiving funding under the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act and all Oxford Houses are strictly prohibited from serving people who are not
well on the road to recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993); see also
MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. C at 5-6 (delineating Oxford House relapse rules which
are extraordinarily stringent).
In practice, hard facts indicate that group homes for recovering substance
abusers cause no increase in crime. Extensive research data support the notion that
people with disabilities who live in group homes, including recovering substance
abusers, are arrested less frequently than members of the general public. See R.
LUBIN ET AL., LIVING ALTERNATIVES RESEARCH PROJECT, THE LIKELIHOOD OF POLICE
CONTACTS WITH DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN COMMUNITY RESIDENCES
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plunge.18 2
Community chaiacter remains intact.183
Indeed,
research indicates that such programs improve the communities in
which they operate."'
Although community fear regarding group homes for recovering
substance abusers is not-based upon fact, it is not irrational. The

(1982) (studying 368 community residences in New York and finding that mentally
retarded persons in community residences are arrested at far lower rates than
members of the general public and further finding that group-home residents are
rarely involved with the police), cited in Robert L. Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred.YearFlood
Plains"andOther UnconstitutionalChallengesto the Establishment of Community Residences
for the Mentally Retarded, 16 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1, 9 n.35 (1988); see also Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1570 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (discussing
studies performed by zoning experts that indicate that such programs do not have an
impact on crime and safety); Tom Pelton, FederalLaw Is Letting Group Homes Tiptoe
into Town: New Rules Open Doorfor Mentally Disabled, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 4, 1994, at 1,
16 (noting that studies have shown that group homes do not raise crime rates).
8 Public concern about decreased property values resulting from the presence
of group homes is equally unfounded. Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that
community housing for people with all sorts of disabilities does not affect the market
value or marketability of neighboring homes. Such examinations have measured the
length of time the home remained on the market, the sale price as a percentage of
the list price, the rate of turnover, and the rate of the property's appreciation. See
George Galster & Yolanda Williams, Dwellingsfor the Severely Mentally Disabled and
Neighborhood Property Values: The Details Matter, 70 LAND ECON. 466, 466 (1994)
(noting the widespread opinion of researchers, based on the results of numerous
studies, that group housing for mentally disabled residents does not reduce the value
of neighboring properties); see also Katherine M. Boydell et al., The Effect of Group
Homes for the Mentally Ill on Residential Property Values, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 957, 958 (1989) (reporting the results of a study finding that "the
presence of a group home for the psychiatrically disabled in a residential neighborhood had no adverse effect on property values"); Stephen Farber, MarketSegmentation
and the Effects on Group Homesfor the Handicapped on Residential Property Values, 23
URB. STUD. 519, 524 (1986) (concluding that group homes positively affect housing
prices in below-average socioeconomic submarkets and that group homes have no
observable or statistically significant effect in high socioeconomic markets); Carey S.
Ryan & Ann Coyne, Effects of GroupHomes on NeighborhoodProperty Values, 23 MENTAL
RETARDATION 241,244-45 (1985) (determining that the presence of a group home did
not adversely affect the length of time a house remained on the market, the rate of
turnover in a neighborhood, or the sale price as a percentage of the list price); Wahl,
supra note 42, at 255 (finding that although the majority of survey respondents
expected that a group home would unfavorably affect property values and home sales,
a majority found no such unfavorable effect when a group home was actually placed
in their neighborhoods).
...
See Diana Arens, What Do the Neighbors Think Now? Community Residences on
Long Island, New York, 29 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTHJ. 235, 239 (1993) (reporting
findings from a study that showed only 2% of people in neighborhoods with group
homes felt negatively about the effects on the neighborhood after two to three years).
"8See Boydell et al., supra note 182, at 958 (stating that group homes may
upgrade neighborhoods through renovations and commenting that "[s]uch facilities
are frequently in better structural and physical condition than other homes in the
surrounding area").
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frequently expressed concern that group homes simply "don't
belong" in their communities is founded upon very natural
phenomena. Neighborhoods often operate as extraordinarily
defensive social organizations, mobilizing rapidly when something
threatens their character and stability. 8 5 When community
members feel threatened, they exhibit protectionist attitudes and
exercise oppositional tactics to defend their turf. They try to
8 6
exclude the sources of their concern.1
Such fears are based on a variety of sociological and psychological principles, particularly heuristics. Outsiders seeking entry into
a neighborhood not only epitomize difference, which is frequently
perceived as threatening in itself, but they also represent disease
and current social ills."8 7 In this context, group homes are seen
as emblems of incapacity, providing shelter for "conniving malingerers" and deviants.' 8
Local opposition to outsiders based on such perceptions is,
indeed, a phenomenon on the rise. Private, fenced-in communities
establish their own regulations and avoid municipal ordinances.' 8 9

's

See generally Harold A. Ellis, NeighborhoodOppositionand the PermissiblePurposes

of Zoning, 7J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 275, 275 (1992) (discussing the factors that

influence neighborhood opposition).
" See Dear, supra note 172, at 290-91 (discussing NIMBYism in terms of human
services planning); see also Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political
Theory, Land Use Policy, and the "Not in My Back Yard" Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV.
945,953 (1992) (describing community fear as a method of segregating marginalized
groups that replaced more traditional methods such as committing people to mental
health institutions).
"s"See Margulies, supra note 186, at 953, 955 (explaining the mental processes
used by members of neighborhoods when group homes are sought to be established
in them).
Defects in human inference account for much popular opposition to
community human service facilities. Human inference runs on heuristics
and biases which guide and simplify thought. Unfortunately, these devices
magnify the perceived risks of association with those labeled as outsiders,
including human service clients.
Id. at 954-55 (footnote omitted); see also Gladwell, supra note 172, at A18 (commenting that advocates for the disabled assert that people at the margins of society serve
as scapegoats for the larger problems of society).
's Margulies, supra note 186, at 955.
9
..
See Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in PrivateCommunities: The Serene Fortress,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1 (describing the rapid growth of private communities,
encircled by gates and fences and nearly always governed by "a thicket of covenants,
codes, and restrictions"); id. at 1, 10 (stating that enclosed private communities are
the fastest growing residential areas in the nation, with nearly 4 million inhabitants,
and that 28 million Americans currently live in areas governed by private community
associations, which number is expected to double within the next decade).
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Laws now require neighbor notification when sex offenders move
into communities. 90 One community service expert observed:
"The last two or three years has been the turning point. It's no
longer 'not in my backyard.'t It's now an opposition to everything
"t
everywhere by everyone. 9
2. How Communities Use the Zoning Process to
Exclude Group Homes for Recovering
Substance Abusers
Neighborhood opposition is perpetuated by the legitimate
purposes of zoning itself. Originally, zoning and local land-use
regulations were simply thought of as a method for regulating the
physical aspects of a municipality's environment. 92 They have,
however, evolved into something far greater. Rather than mere
mechanisms for minimizing the negative physical features in a
particular community, local zoning now defines good and bad
neighborhoods and determines who can and cannot reside in them.
Specifically, zoning laws seek to protect property values and regulate
the socioeconomic environment of a community. 93 They establish whether neighborhoods are residential, commercial, or
industrial. They determine whether homes are detached, multifami-

ly, apartments, mobile, highly concentrated, set-back, large, tall, or
ugly. On a more theoretical level, local land-use ordinances operate

190 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-4909, 45-221(a)(29)(C) (Supp. 1994) (requiring

that lists of all sex offenders be made available to the public); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 895(H) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring all sex offenders to mail notices to all
neighbors within a one-mile radius in rural areas and a three-block radius in urban
areas, and further requiring that the offender must publish the information in a local
journal for two days); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-8 (West 1995) ("Megan's Law")
(establishing a three-tiered scheme ranking the sex offenders' risk of recidivism and
varying the level of community notification based upon their ranking); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing public agencies "to release
relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the
release of the information is necessary for public protection").
"9 Gladwell, supra note 172, at A18.
192 SeeJ. Gregory Richards, Zoningfor Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761,
762-63 (describing the original goals of zoning); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-96 (1926) (considering the constitutionality of a
municipality's zoning plan and focusing on the physical problems, such as lack of
sunlight and an increase in traffic and noise, when evaluating the scheme's validity).
"' See Anne B. Shlay & Peter H. Rossi, Keeping Up the Neighborhood. EstimatingNet
Effects of Zoning, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 703, 717 (1981) (examining the political dimension
of zoning, describing how it works, and finding that "[z]oning is an important, local,
political method for shaping the housing and population composition of metropolitan
neighborhoods").

1995]

THE FHAA AND GROUP HOMES

as the preeminent symbol of social identification1 9 4 and perhaps
the most effective mechanism for direct social control.'95
The enforcement of local zoning laws can, in fact, be characterized as the ideal manifestation of civic responsibility9 6 and participatory democracy. 97 The process of zoning encourages a distinct
sense of local control. This is achieved through the election or
appointment of local board members, the dividing of municipalities
into distinct land-use categories, the establishment of procedural
rules regarding the determination of appropriate and unacceptable
land uses, and the public hearing and notice process. Using these
means, communities have become entrenched in the notion that the
establishment and enforcement of zoning laws is their specific
bailiwick for mobilization. 9 ' This, coupled with a process charac199
terized by fragmented, and often random decisionmaking,
serves to solidify zoning as a winner-take-all method for banning
200
that which cannot be prohibited directly.
194See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,

AND AMERICAN LAW 214-15 (1990) (using local opposition to group homes as a

method of modeling attitudes toward difference); see also Lea S. VanderVelde, Local
Knowledge Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1057, 1074 (1990)
("From location flows the social organization of where your children attend school,
where you walk your dog, and where you buy your groceries. Zoning assures that
others who you are most likely to bump into are on your same social level.").
...
See Richards, supra note 192, at 765 (examining land regulation as a method
for excluding or including on the basis of relatively immutable characteristics as
defined by an ordinance); see also VanderVelde, supra note 194, at 1060 (commenting
that "[tihe zoning process, like selecting a place to live, is 'an important way in which
people assert a sense of mastery and control over their environment'" (quoting A.
RAPOPORT, HUMAN ASPECTS OF URBAN FORM: TOWARDS A MAN-ENVIRONMENT
APPROACH TO URBAN FORM AND DESIGN 368 (1977))).
196 See Margulies, supra note 186, at 945-46 ("Bitter opposition to facility siting

mocks attempts to revive civic republican participation in deliberation about the
common good, and clashes with liberal precepts of fairness and equality." (citations
omitted)).
197
See BRION, supra note 178, at 30-47 (describing NIMBYism as a model of
participatory democracy); see also Frank J. Popper, LULUs and Their Blockage: The
Nature of the Problem, The Outline of the Solutions, in CONFRONTING REGIONAL
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO LULUS, GROWTH, AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE

PROBLEMS 13, 16 (Joseph F. DiMento & LeRoy Graymer eds., 1991) (explaining locally
unwanted land-uses as an indication "that the Untied States is transforming itself into
a... more democratic.., society").
19' See Ellis, supra note 185, at 275-76 (recognizing zoning as a legitimate exercise
of police power and neighborhood opposition as an integral part of the process).
199 See VanderVelde, supra note 194, at 1067-72 (reviewing the activities of local
zoning boards); see also Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregationand Local Discretion, 3
J.L. & POL'Y 209,212 (1994) (noting widespread delegation of responsibility for landuse 2regulation
to municipalities).
9
1 See John D. Hutcheson, Jr. & James E. Prather, Community Mobilization and
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Indeed, for community housing dedicated to the rehabilitation
of recovering drug addicts, such laws have functioned too effectively. With distressing frequency, they have served to impede the
establishment of group homes and to perpetuate discrimination
against recovering substance abusers. Faced with fervent community opposition, much-needed residential drug rehabilitation programs, along with numerous other types of community-based
programs, frequently lack sufficient resources to win in town hall or
in court, and, as a result, they must either give up on the sites or
20
relocate in far less suitable communities. 1
The most important and problematic obstacles confronting
group homes for recovering substance abusers are single-family
home zoning ordinances. Located at the apex of the "Euclidean
Pyramid," 212 single-family residential communities often display
the most vehement opposition to the siting of Oxford Houses and
similar programs. To keep recovery houses out, communities
accommodating single-family homes employ a variety of zoning
techniques. 203 Sometimes, these involve the direct regulation of
housing for persons with disabilities. 20 4 More often, however, they
appear as facially neutral statutes, specifically, notice requirements
Participationin the Zoning Process, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 346, 347 (1988) (describing the
process as one with clearly identifiable winners and losers in which, from the
community's perspective, decisions go either "for them" or "against them").
211 See Margulies, supra note 186, at 962-63.
Poor communities' lack of access to this repertoire of resistance reinforces
market tendencies to concentrate human service facilities in low-income
neighborhoods. [In these neighborhoods,] real estate is less valuable....
Ironically, communities used as "dumping grounds" tend to have fragile
support systems which are least able to meet the needs of citizens receiving
services.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Hutcheson & Prather, supra note 200, at 346-49
(discussing consistent findings that community participation in zoning is negatively
associated with community affluence).
202 See Schlay & Rossi, supra note 193, at 705 ("Euclidean zoning designated a rank
ordering of land-use desirability to guide local governments in their decisions.
Zoning's primary purpose was specified as protecting neighborhoods ofsingle-family
dwellings, placed at the top of the priority pyramid."); VanderVelde, supranote 194,
at 1063 n.30 (commenting that single-family detached housing is at the "pinnacle of
the zoning law pyramid" and that "all other forms of residential units often are
evaluated for their capacity to harm single-family residential housing").
203 See Schonfeld & Stein, supra note 116, at 307 (describing the discriminatory
impact of such ordinances).
204 See e.g., infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (describing a zoning ordinance that requires 24-hour supervision of group homes and the establishment of a
community advisory committee to facilitate a neighborhood complaint process for
such programs).
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or similar conditions that particularly affect group residences for
handicapped persons. 20 5 These ordinances often seem innocuous,
20 6
and any judicial intervention may appear to be over-reaching.
Yet zoning ordinances are often applied to group homes serving
people with disabilities in ways that are far from benign, making
close judicial scrutiny necessary. By applying land-use regulations
that restrict the definition of the family and limit access to residential neighborhoods, municipalities have unlawfully established ways
to discriminate against group homes for recovering substance
abusers while maintaining the appearance of exercising legitimate
local control.
B. Judicial Tolerance of Zoning Laws That
Exclude Group Homes
Municipal authority must be curtailed when it infringes upon the
rights of disabled persons. Yet, for group homes for recovering
substance abusers, the courts have failed to fulfill this responsibility.
This is not the result of judges lacking the tools for effective
enforcement, for the FHAA provides a powerful arsenal of legal
remedies. 20 ' This is not the result of the courts turning a blind
eye, for there are many instances in which local laws that perpetuate
housing bias are successfully invalidated. 0 8 Rather, courts fail to
protect effectively the housing rights of group homes for recovering
o See e.g., infra notes 227-39 (discussing Palatine, Illinois's zoning ordinance
requiring special-use approval for establishing group homes in single-family
residential neighborhoods).
' See The Fair Housing and Free Speech Act of 1995, S. 1132, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess., discussed in 141 CONG. REC. S12,079 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Faircloth) (proposing provisions that would overrule the Supreme Court's decision
in Edmonds, and stating that "decisions about zoning should be made in cities and
towns and not in Washington"). This concern drew opposition to the FHA prior to
its original passage in 1968. See Leland B. Ware, New Weaponsfor an Old Battle: The
EnforcementProvisionsof the 1988 Amendments to the FairHousingAct, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 59, 71-72 (1993) ("Opponents of the fair housing bill claimed that the legislation
would interfere impermissibly with the right of citizens to control the disposition of
their property.").
o See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612-3614 (enumerating mechanisms for enforcement through
HUD, private parties, and the U.S. Attorney General).
'2o See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp.
1285, 1296-97 (D. Md. 1993) (invalidating a neighbor-notification requirement
because it created an explicit classification based on a disability without any legitimate
justification); Oxford House, Inc. V. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,465
(D.N.J. 1992) (enjoining enforcement of a local zoning ordinance that would prevent
prospective residents of a group home for recovering substance abusers from moving
in).
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substance abusers because they erroneously interpret one test for
proving FHAA violations-the "reasonable accommodations" clause.
When it passed the FHAA, Congress intended that communities
be prohibited from employing zoning ordinances and local housing
policies in a manner that denies people with disabilities access to
housing on par with that of those who are not disabled. It intended
that when laws fail to do this, they must be invalidated or rewritten
to meet the residential needs of handicapped persons. This is the
meaning of "reasonable accommodations." 2 9 Yet, courts consistently fail to recognize this obligation. Rather than recognize the
"reasonable accommodations" clause as an affirmative obligation,
courts employ a balancing test when examining special permit
proceedings, and weigh community interests against the statutorily
protected rights of recovering substance abusers. In turn, they
uphold special permit proceedings, notice requirements, and other
ordinances that operate to exclude group homes for recovering
substance abusers.
1. Disability-Based Classifications
In a world without the FHAA, municipalities could easily
prevent group homes for recovering substance abusers from
entering their communities by enacting zoning ordinances that
explicitly distinguish between disabled and nondisabled persons.
From a town's perspective, such an ideal provision would directly
and completely preclude recovery houses from entering singlefamily residential neighborhoods. Yet, the FHAA does exist, and
courts usually find that such measures clearly violate it. But the
FHAA is not uniformly successful in this respect. Serious problems
remain when courts assess laws that explicitly treat disabled persons
differently than others.
The basic rule regarding disability-based classification is set
forth in Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township of
Upper Southampton,"'0 which states that "[a]n ordinance that uses
a discriminatory classification[] is unlawful in all but rare circum209 See infra part IV.A (describing an alternative interpretation of the "reasonable
accommodations" clause based upon the concept of affirmative obligation).
210 804 F. Supp. 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (granting declaratory and injunctive
relief to a residential program for persons with mental retardation from an ordinance
setting forth a 1000-foot spacing requirement for all group homes), affid, 995 F.2d
217 (3d Cir. 1993).
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stances.""
Such a violation can be established in one of three
ways: (1) by demonstrating that the challenged statute has no
legitimate purpose; (2) by showing that its classifications were
adopted on the basis of handicap; or (3) by proving that the statute
had a discriminatory effect.2 12 That same year, the Sixth Circuit
decided the leading case, Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow. 213 This
decision invalidated a zoning ordinance that imposed onerous safety
requirements on programs serving the disabled in residential
neighborhoods. 214 Another significant case, more recently decided,

is Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomey County.215

Citing

Marbrunak and Horizon House, it held that a neighbor-notification
requirement created to apply explicitly to people with disabilities
216
was unjustified and in violation of the FHAA.
Unfortunately, for group homes for recovering substance
abusers, the fact that most courts find disability-based classifications
to be unlawful offers cold comfort. Two decisions, one of which is
a Tenth Circuit case decided this year, indicate that such laws are
sometimes permissible.
Until recently, the only case to validate zoning restrictions
applicable specifically to group homes was Familystyle of St. Pau Inc.
v. City of St. Paul,217 in which the Eighth Circuit upheld state and
municipal dispersal requirements for group homes serving the
mentally ill because it believed that the provision promoted
community integration of people with disabilities.21 8 It is interesting to note, however, that this decision was reached in spite of the
fact that the organization providing the housing believed that the
219
statute harmed, rather than benefitted, preople with disabilities.
211

Id. at 693.

See id. (citing United States v. Schuylkill Township, No. 90-2165, 1990 WL
180980, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1990)).
212

21S

974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992) (invalidating stringent safety standards applicable

only to homes serving people with developmental disabilities).
214

See id. at 47-48 (finding safety requirements to violate the FHAA on the basis

that they were unduly burdensome and not specifically tailored to the particular
disabilities of the residents),
211 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993) (striking a public notice requirement
specifically applicable to group homes for people with disabilities).
216 See id. at 1296, 1302.
217 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
218
See id. at 94-95 ("The state's group home dispersal requirements are designed
to ensure that mentally handicapped persons needing residential treatment will not

be forced into enclaves of treatment facilities that would replicate and thus
perpetuate the isolation resulting from institutionalization.").
219 See id. at 93 ("Familystyle argues that the Minnesota and St. Paul dispersal
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The second and more recent case calling into question the
legality of disability-based classifications is Bangerter v. Orem City
Corp.22 In this case, a municipality enacted two facially discriminatory rules: it required that a group home for the mentally handicapped be supervised on a twenty-four hour basis; and it also
required that a community advisory committee be established to
address all complaints and concerns of the program's neighbors.22 1 Although the Tenth Circuit found that the group home
established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under
the FHAA,222 reversing the lower court's dismissal of the group
home's complaint, it remanded the case for further review.22 In
so doing, the Tenth Circuit severely narrowed the group home's
ability to prove unlawful discrimination. The court explained that
the town could rebut the prima facie case of intentional discrimination if it could prove that: (1) this particular group home was
subjected to no more restrictions than other non-handicapped
group homes in the town;224 (2) there was a public safety reason
for the provisions; 2 25 or (3) these restrictions, although explicitly

requirements are invalid because they limit housing choices of the mentally
handicapped and therefore conflict with the language and purpose of the 1988
Amendments to the Fair Housing Act.").
20 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
21 As explained in the court's opinion:
In granting the permit ... the Council imposed two conditions on the
group home that Bangerter alleges violate the FHAA:
[1] [the group home operator] had to ensure the City that the residents
were properly supervised on a twenty-four-hour basis; [and]
[2] [the group home operator] had to establish a community advisory
committee through which all complaints and concerns of the neighbors
could be addressed.
Id. at 1496 (alterations in original).
See id. at 1502 ("We agree with the district court's initial conclusion that
Bangerter
made out a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHAA.").
22
See id.
224 The court stated:
On remand, Bangerter will have to introduce evidence to support his
allegations of discrimination. Besides proving sufficient concrete personal
injury to maintain standing, Bangerter must support his basic claim that his
group home was subjected to conditions not imposed on other group homes
in Orem that were permitted in areas zoned.., for single-family residences.
If Bangerter cannot show that group homes for the non-handicapped are
permitted in Orem without requirements like the 24-hour supervision or
neighborhood advisory committee requirements, he will have failed to show
that he has suffered differential treatment when compared to a similarly
situated group, and his claims will fail under the FHAA.
See id.
' See id. at 1503-04 (commenting that on remand the court should investigate
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discriminatory, "are really beneficial to, rather than discriminatory
226
against, the handicapped."

Familystyle and Bangerterraise the possibility of enormous FHAA
loopholes. They are a far cry from the "all but rare circumstances"
exception suggested in Horizon House. These seemingly "rare
circumstances" occur with distressing frequency. If they can arise
whenever a community can offer some benign justification for
facially discriminatory ordinances, these "rare circumstances" may,
in fact, drastically curtail the scope of the FHAA with regard to
group homes for recovering substance abusers.
2. Special-Use Permitting Procedures
Facially discriminatory zoning laws must be fairly sophisticated
if courts are to uphold them. The same is true for facially neutral
ordinances. This is why communities opposing group homes for
recovering substance abusers increasingly rely on subtle and
complex modes of segregation. For anyone who doubts how
creative communities can be when they want to exclude group
homes for recovering substance abusers, she need only examine the
recent special-use permitting procedures employed by cities and
towns to discriminate against recovering substance abusers in singlefamily residential zones. 227 Sadly, the courts too often uphold
these procedures. Two especially stunning blows were delivered
directly to Oxford Houses: United States v. Village of Palatine22
229
and Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach.
Recovering substance abusers can only live in an R-1B Single
Family District in Palatine, Illinois, if they are part of a "family" or
live in a "group home." For zoning purposes within the municipality, a "family" means only: (1) a nuclear family plus not more than
three relatives, or (2) a group of up to three nonrelatives. Under
whether the Orem supervision requirement was on- or off-site, and how "oppressive
or benign it might have been").

" Id. at 1504 (emphasizing that the FHAA only makes it illegal to discriminate
against handicapped persons).
2 See e.g., Lynne Carrier, Council Seeks More Control of Group Homes, SAN DIEGO
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 11, 1995, at Al (describing how the city council earmarked
$26,000 to pinpoint the location of group homes, approved a voluntary "good
neighbor" policy to "prepare the community for any new group homes that plan to

locate in their vicinity," and established a requirement that all group homes with
seven or more beds obtain a conditional-use permit involving public notification).
22 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
'z

825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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the zoning ordinance, a "group home" must have a paid professional support staff.2 0 Residents of Oxford House-Mallard, situated
in this type of district, met neither of these standards. As a result,
this group of eleven unrelated recovering alcoholics and addicts
violated local zoning restrictions when they moved in. Subsequent
to their occupancy, Palatine amended its zoning ordinance to allow
them to reside within the R-1B zone, not as of right, but through
the process of special-use approval. Oxford House, as a matter of
principle, refused to initiate this procedure, and as a result, Palatine
23 1
cited it for violating the municipal zoning ordinance.
If Oxford House had complied with the special-use process and
participated in this new procedural requirement, there still would
have been no assurance that such municipal approval would be
awarded. Merely to be considered, Oxford House residents would
have been forced to subject themselves to a lengthy, contentious
public hearing process and would have been scrutinized by a
community that had already expressed deep-seated opposition to
their presence. 23 2 They were unwilling to do so and sued Palatine
for failure to make reasonable accommodations under the FHAA by
requiring them to undergo scrutiny not otherwise required of those
Palatine,37 F.3d at 1231-32.
MOLLOY, supra note 4, at 16; see also Palatine,37 F.3d at 1232 ("As a matter
of practice, Oxford House, Inc. does not seek prior approval of zoning regulations
before moving into a residential neighborhood. It considers itself no different from
family and its members just move into any suitable house .... ").
a biological
2
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Palatineis completely silent regarding Palatine
residents' opposition to the establishment of the Oxford House. The unreported
lower court's "Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction," however, is not. It notes, in part:
Shortly after Oxford House signed the lease on the Mallard Drive
property and before any residents moved into the residence, ... the
Village's Planning and Zoning Administrator... informed [the landlord]
that the Village had 'received numerous complaints about a halfway house
for recovering alcoholics being proposed' at her residence....
230 See
231 See

[A village council member] suggested that due to political pressure,
Oxford House should keep the number of residents in the house to four
and not fill the house until after the scheduled municipal spring elections.
He said that Oxford House would still have to apply for a special use permit
and a text amendment.... [The same council member] stated that "it was
in [Oxford House's] best interest to make-to make friends with the
neighbors because if the neighbors came out and opposed [the] applications, then the applications would be denied."
United States v. Village of Palatine, No. 93-C 2154, 1993 WL 586699, at *7-8 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 28, 1993).
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living in the single-family residential zone.233 Unfortunately, they
lost.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the zoning ordinance and further
held that Oxford House residents could only bring a valid FHAA
claim after they completed the formal special-use permitting
process. 3 4 Palatine's president, Rita Mullins, like so many in her
town, was thrilled. Palatine had successfully forced the group home
to submit to its special-use permit process. It had won a victory for
proponents of local control. Mullins was able to attend the annual
National League of Cities Conference in Minneapolis and boast of
her success in fighting for the community's rights. 3 5
Palatineclearly illustrates a flawed judicial interpretation of the
FHAA and, in particular, incorrect application of its "reasonable
accommodations" provision. Indeed, the court's reasoning is almost
as disturbing as the Mullins's actions. Responding to Oxford
House's claim that the very invocation of the special-use permitting
process failed to reasonably accommodate the needs of individuals
protected under the FHAA, the court balanced each party's
interests, weighing the need for public input against the burden
public hearings would place on the program's residents.2 36 The
Seventh Circuit sympathized with program residents who would be
scrutinized and stigmatized by the hearing process, in spite of
Palatine's assurances that they had no legal obligation to attend the
public meetings.23 7 Despite this concern, the court decided that
" See Palatine,37 F.3d at 1233 ("Plaintiff argues that requiring the residents of
Oxford House-Mallard to undergo a public hearing on their proposed special use
would subject them to 'a firestorm ofvocal opposition within the neighborhood,' that
in turn would stigmatize the residents and increase the chances of a relapse.").
' See id. at 1234 (noting that the zoning process, including the hearing and
conditional-use permit process, enables the city to reasonably accommodate the group
home, rather than finding that the permitting hearings are themselves at the root of
the problem).
23 See Sarah Talalay, Palatine'sWin Based on Process, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1994, § 2,
at 1 (noting that Mullins was planning to take along copies of the appeals court
decision with her to the conference in December, 1994).
2
m See Palatine,37 F.3d at 1234 ("[D]etermining whether a requested accommodation is reasonable requires, among other things, balancing the needs of the parties
involved.").
2'7 The court stated:
Plaintiff argues that requiring the residents of Oxford House-Mallard to
undergo a public hearing on their proposed special use would subject them
to "a firestorm of vocal opposition within the neighborhood"... . We are
also sympathetic to plaintiff's concern that even if the Oxford HouseMallard residents were not required to appear at a public meeting, such a
meeting would serve to focus neighborhood scrutiny on the residence and
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because Palatine had adequately responded to the needs of other
handicapped individuals on former occasions, it could risk harm to
these handicapped people in the present." 8 On balance, the
Seventh Circuit held that public input was more important than
shielding these disabled individuals from potential, even probable,
23 9
harm.
Thus, Palatine stands for the proposition that "'reasonable
accommodations in rules [and] policies . .. when . . . necessary to
afford the [handicapped person] equal opportunity'" 240 entail
promising hypothetical, rather than actual protections against
discrimination. The mere existence of a purely theoretical possibility that the special-use permitting process could be employed in a
nondiscriminatory fashion was sufficient reason to uphold the
ordinance. The harsh realities of the special-use permitting process,
along with the blatant admission that public hearings would
discriminate against disabled people were completely irrelevant.
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach24 1 was based on a
relatively similar set of circumstances. Virginia Beach's zoning
ordinance defines a "family" to include groups of no more than four
people unrelated by blood or marriage. In order to establish any
home in a single-family residence that fails this requirement,
prospective residents are forced to obtain conditional-use permits.
Applications for conditional-use permits must be filed with the
planning director, reviewed by the planning commission, and then
approved by the city council. Furthermore, Virginia Beach's zoning
code requires that applicants publish notice of the request followed
by a public hearing. 24 2 As in Palatine, Oxford House refused
to reduce the number of residents or apply for the conditionaluse permit.243 And, like Palatine, the Virginia Beach court incor-

stigmatize its inhabitants as recovering alcoholics.
Id. at 1233-34.
228 See id. at 1234 (noting that because Palatine has a good record in responding
to the needs of handicapped individuals, "it cannot be said that resort by Oxford
House-Mallard to the special use procedure would be futile").
239 See id. (concluding that the harm likely to befall Oxford House residents did
not outweigh the municipal interest in receiving public input during the special-use
permitting process).
2,1Id. at 1232 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)) (second alteration in original).
241825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993).
242 See id. at 1255 (explaining the conditional-use permit application process,

including its notice and public hearing requirements).

"' See id. at 1255-56 (stating that Oxford House argued that it was "not 'fair or
feasible' to require [them] to apply for a conditional use permit because the
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rectly applied the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the
FHAA.
VirginiaBeach stated that Congress clearly did not intend federal
courts to become "entangled prematurely in disputes regarding
application of neutral zoning ordinances to the handicapped."24 4
Therefore, any obligation for group home residents to participate
in public hearings could not constitute an FHAA violation. 245 Yet,
the Virginia Beach court went even further. It concluded that for
Oxford Houses to protect themselves from the ravages of conditional-use hearing procedures, they must be able to locate specific
246
provisions in the FHAA that insulate them from such scrutiny.
Because such language is not explicit in the statute, the Oxford
Houses were obligated to participate in the special zoning process.
Palatine and Virginia Beach provide a powerful arsenal for
communities seeking to alienate rather than to integrate recovering
substance abusers. Indeed, little prevents municipalities from
establishing zoning ordinances in all circumstances requiring every
group home for recovering substance abusers to undergo stringent
notice and hearing requirements. The FHAA states that people
with disabilities should be treated no differently than people
without disabilities. Yet, courts uphold discriminatory zoning
ordinances. They are able to do so only when they balance the
interests of local authorities-interests often guided by bias, as well
as by politics-against the housing rights of people with disabilities.247

application process will expose the residents 'to effectively unrestricted public scrutiny
of their personal lives and histories' that 'can be expected by itself to cause plaintiff
households to disintegrate'").
244 Id. at 1261.
245 See id. ("Congress obviously contemplated providing cities, among others, the
opportunity to adjust their generally applicable rules to allow handicapped individuals
equal access to housing. The zoning process, including the hearings on applications
for conditional use permits, serves that purpose." (citation omitted)).
246 See id. at 1262.
[The] plaintiffs point to no provision of the [FHAA] suggesting [that it]
insulate[s] such individuals from legitimate inquiries designed to enable
local authorities to make informed decisions on zoning issues.... [I]f
Congress had intended to exempt handicapped persons from participation
in the usual procedural requirements of the zoning process, it could have

do[ne] so expressly.
Id. But see H.R. No. 711, supra note 83, at 24 (noting that the FHAA was intended
"to prohibit the application of... conditional or special use permits that have the
effect of limiting the ability of [handicapped persons] to live in the residence of their
choice"), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
247 In contrast to the Palatineand Virginia Beach decisions, one district court has
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3. Narrow Definitions of Single-Family
Residential Neighborhoods
Some municipalities exclude group homes for recovering
substance abusers by forcing those who establish and operate them
to jump through the hoops of conditional-use permitting processes.
Other towns deter the development of such programs by carving out
other types of facially neutral exceptions in local zoning laws that
have the effect of barring group homes from single-family residential neighborhoods.
Limiting the number of unrelated persons who may live together
in single-family residential neighborhoods was, until recently, the
favorite way for many communities to discriminate against people
with disabilities. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.24 gave the
Supreme Court the opportunity to halt this tactic completely, but in
the end the Court's decision provided only limited recourse for
group homes for recovering substance abusers.
Rather than
declaring that municipal usage of maximum-occupancy limitations
to restrict group-home access to single-family residential neighborhoods constitutes unlawful housing discrimination, the Court held
only that local restrictions on the number of unrelated persons who
may live together constitute land-use regulations rather than
occupancy restrictions and are, therefore, not exempt from FHAA
coverage under § 3607(b)(1). 2 49 Although the Court decided in
favor of Oxford House, and although the ruling was warmly
received by group-home advocates, 250 the victory nevertheless
25
rings somewhat hollow. '

determined that application of this balancing test would cause irreparable harm to
recovering substance abusers. See Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill,
799 F. Supp. 450,464 (D.N.J. 1992). Indeed, other cases involving the housing rights
of group-home residents support this claim. See Potomac Group Home Corp. v.
Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1290, 1296-97 (D. Md. 1993) (describing a
neighborhood-notification process that provoked petitions and letter-writing
campaigns in opposition and resulted in stigma to the residents of the group home);
see also Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F.
Supp. 1197, 1220 (D. Conn. 1992) (concluding that subjecting residents of a facility
for HIV-positive individuals to public scrutiny served to perpetuate the segregation
'of such citizens).
248 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995); see also supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Edmonds and the maximum-occupancy exception).
249 See Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783.
250 See, e.g., Ignacio Lobos, Group-Home Decision Hailed, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16,
1995, at B1 (quoting a variety of supporters of the disabled and noting that the case
represented a victory for the disabled nationwide).
251 See Daniel Lauber, Group Think: A Recent Supreme Court Ruling Should Make
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The lawsuit was based on a claim of failure to provide reasonable accommodations, but the case failed to illuminate the scope
and meaning of the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations"
provision.
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
emphasized that "[t]he sole question before the Court is whether
Edmonds's family composition rule qualifies as a 'restrictio[n]
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy
a dwelling' within the meaning of the FHA's absolute exemption."252 She dismissed municipal concerns that the decision "will
overturn Euclidean zoning" and "destroy the effectiveness and
purpose of single-family zoning"2 53 by assuring the city that the
issue presented was merely a "threshold question" of "limited
scope."2 54 All questions about the meaning of the "reasonable
accommodations" clause went unanswered. Although the Court had
the opportunity clearly to delineate the provision's parameters,
questions regarding the "reasonable accommodations" provision will
continue to be answered by lower courts and local governments.25
The Edmonds decision is in fact so narrow that it is unlikely to
have much impact on anything but municipal reliance on the
maximum-occupancy limit exemption. It does absolutely nothing to
curtail other local initiatives that use single-family zoning rules to
restrict the entry of group homes. Given the limited scope of
Edmonds, it is likely that cities and towns will seek to devise
comparable alternatives. Indeed, it is also likely that the courts will
uphold such practices, provided that they are facially neutral.
One example of such a local initiative is found in the case of
Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor,2 56 a case that did not
involve recovering substance abusers but did involve a single-family
residential zoning restriction. Like the Seventh Circuit in Palatine

Local Governments Reconsider Their Community Residence Regulations, PLANNING, Oct.
1995, at 11 (inquiring whether the Edmonds decision will cause local and state

governments to adjust their zoning regulations to accommodate group homes or
merely to rely on alternate methods of excluding such programs), availablein LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
2-2 Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)) (second alteration
in original).
253 Id. at 1783.
2

5 Id.

" This is in direct contrast to the lower court's decision that discusses, in dicta,

the meaning of the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" clause at great length. See
City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.

1994).
m 13 F.3d 920 (6th Cir. 1993):
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and the Eastern District of Virginia in Virginia Beach, the Sixth
Circuit employed a balancing test to assess the meaning of the
FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" clause-it weighed local
zoning interests against the housing needs of a statutorily protected
group of disabled persons.25 7 Like Edmonds, the city of Taylor
used a facially neutral definition of family to exclude group homes
from a single-family residential neighborhood. Unlike Edmonds,
however, Taylor used a different method of excluding the group
home2 5 -it permitted only nonprofit, rather than for-profit, group
homes in single-family residential neighborhoods. With this restriction, it excluded a group of people who were disabled, elderly, and
protected under the FHAA from the community.25 9
Smith & Lee Associates operated a residential program for
disabled, elderly individuals. In 1989, when the home was originally
established, the company had wanted to house twelve members but
was informed that Taylor would not allow it. Because the program
required a state license in order to operate, municipal approval was
necessary before they could open, regardless of the number of
residents they housed.260 By state law, however, the municipality
was required to permit the inclusion of a residential home for at
least six residents. Although the state would certainly allow for
more, anything in excess of this six-person minimum obligation was
261
considered to be an issue of local zoning concern.
Lacking any alternative, the program opened with the maximum
six-person allotment but quickly found this situation financially
infeasible. 26 2 In early 1990, Smith & Lee Associates petitioned
257See id. at 931.
258 Smith

& Lee Associates v. City of Taylor is not a case involving an Oxford House

or recovering substance abusers. The practices of Taylor and the legal analysis of the
Sixth Circuit are nonetheless relevant as an illustration of the vehicles municipalities
use to exclude all group homes and as an example of a courtes misinterpretation of
the "reasonable accommodations" clause.
259See Smith &Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 925.
21 Given the state licensure requirements for all Adult Foster Care Facilities,
Smith & Lee could not use Oxford House's method of moving in before obtaining
municipal permission.
261See Smith & Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 923 (citing MICH. COMp. LAws
§§ 125.583b(2), 400.716(2) (1993)).
262 See United States v. City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(noting that municipal officials refused to issue a building permit until after they were
convinced by a state licensing consultant that such a denial would violate both the
FHAA and state law), rev'd sub nom. Smith & Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d 920. When the
permit was eventually issued, it contained the express limitation, "SINGLE FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL USE ONLY." See id.

!
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Taylor to rezone the site. Although none of the neighbors objected
at the hearings, although the house was found to be clean and well
maintained,26 3 and although there was, at this point, no claim that
such rezoning would overburden public facilities or raise problems
for traffic, public safety, and similar difficulties, the City Council
denied the zoning ordinance. The Council claimed that it was
concerned about spot zoning and inconsistencies with the city's
2 64

master plan.

Smith & Lee Associates responded with an alternative proposal.
Rather than rezone the area, the city could provide a "letter of noopposition" to the Department of Social Services, the state licensing
agency, with authority to grant an exception to the single-family
area's zoning rule. 265 It appeared that this exception would be an
acceptable alternative given the broad scope of the Taylor's
definition of "family," which did not limit the number of unrelated
individuals that could reside together. Indeed, the definition was
quite broad, providing that even "[a] collective member [sic] of
individuals domiciled together in one (1) dwelling unit whose
relationship is of a continuing nontransient domestic character and
who are cooking and living as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit"
could be considered to be a family. 266 In spite of this liberal
language, however, the Council Chairman never even put this
267
proposal to a vote.

The district court that originally heard the case found that
Taylor failed to reasonably accommodate Smith & Lee Associates
under the parameters of the FHAA. 268 The court based its finding
partially on the fact that all members of the Taylor City Council
testified identically that they were concerned about parking, police,
269
and fire, and that they were concerned about spot zoning.
Their "constant repetition" of precisely the same concerns, along
with the fact that the city failed even to study the impact on parking
and traffic or the legitimacy of police and fire department concerns,
substantially undermined the Council's credibility. 27
These
factors indicated to the courts that the stated fears accompanying
26 See id. at 445.
264 See Smith & Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 923.

265See City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. at 445.
266 Smith & Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d at 925 (alteration in original).
267 See id. at 923-24
26 See City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. at 448 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).
269 See id. at 446-47.
270See id.
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home development were clearly pretextual. Unlawful discrimination
was at the heart of the decision. Based on this finding, the district
could have
court stated that there was "no question" that Taylor
271
reasonably accommodated the facility with ease.
The Sixth Circuit overruled this decision and held that Taylor
neither intentionally discriminated nor failed to reasonably
accommodate Smith & Lee Associates. 27 2 This decision ignored
the clear pretext of the city's actions and failed to find discriminatory intent. It also misconstrued the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" requirement and improperly balanced the city's interest
in single-family residential zones against the housing needs of the
disabled.
The Sixth Circuit dispensed with the intentional discrimination
claim by holding that although a group of twelve unrelated people
could go to a traditional landlord and rent a home in a single-family
residential neighborhood, a group of elderly Alzheimer's patients
could not make the same request of a for-profit agency. The only
distinction between the two groups was the fact that the Alzheimer's
patients needed to rent from a for-profit agency in order to live in
a residential area. Thus, but for the nonprofit requirement of
Taylor's zoning provision, a group of twelve unrelated people could
live in the single-family residential neighborhood.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Smith & Lee Associates also
distorted the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" standard by
balancing the city's right to zone against handicapped people's
rights to be free from discrimination. 273 That the home's structure was inconsistent with Taylor's zoning policies-merely because
it was a for-profit entity rather than a nonprofit entity-was
sufficient reason to refuse issuing the letter of permission.
By drawing this highly dubious distinction between "for-profit"
and "not-for-profit" homes, the Sixth Circuit completely missed the
point. The court found that Smith & Lee Associates had not
requested changes in zoning laws to accommodate people with
disabilities, but rather had sought to accommodate a for-profit
enterprise. By leaving individual rights and the needs of the
disabled out of the reasonable accommodations equation, Smith &
271
22

See id. at 447.

See Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d at 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1993).

273 See 13 F.3d at 931 ("We balance the City's interests against the need for an

accommodation in this case.").
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Lee Associates effectively crippled the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" standard.
Once again, the judiciary avoided the FHAA's mandate to
prohibit discrimination against recovering substance abusers by
balancing the statutory mandate against a municipality's right to
zone. The Court in Smith &Lee Associates failed, in part, because it
did not acknowledge that, were it not for the fact that these people
were handicapped, they would have been allowed to live in the
single-family residential zone. This is precisely the sort of action the
FHAA forbids.
IV.

REMOVING COMMUNITY AND JUDICIALLY IMPOSED

OBSTACLES TO GROUP HOMES FOR RECOVERING
SUBSTANCE ABUSERS

Group homes for recovering substance abusers work, and
Congress agrees that they are necessary. Yet communities labor
feverishly to exclude these programs, and courts too frequently let
cities and towns get away with such efforts. When the problem is
put in simple terms, the solution is obvious-courts must more
effectively use the legal tools at their disposal to protect the rights
of former drug addicts and alcoholics. A person's disabilities, no
matter what they are, should not prevent her from realizing the goal
of living in a safe, stable neighborhood.
The municipal capacity to regulate land use, however, significantly complicates this matter. Zoning is a well-established, highly
valued component of local decisionmaking.2 74 It is not a power
cities and towns will voluntarily relinquish. The likelihood of
municipalities doing so diminishes even more when such a surrender will benefit former addicts, and when, from the community's
standpoint, it threatens community integrity.
The conflict between the FHAA and municipal zoning power
requires ajudicial solution; one that addresses only reasonable local
concerns and one that recognizes Congress's clear statutory
mandate. Thus far, most courts have been unwilling to fully accept
this responsibility. The judiciary has not only refused to take the
remedial action required under the FHAA, it has ignored the subtle
discrimination embodied in exclusionary ordinances.

274 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding
that local legislatures have broad zoning powers).
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"ReasonableAccommodations" Means
Affirmative Obligation

Courts must halt local use of the more subtle and complex
methods of discriminating against group homes for recovering
substance abusers. They can succeed, however, only if § 3604(f)(3)
of the FHAA, the "reasonable accommodations" clause, is given the
broad effect Congress intended. This provision requires cities and
towns to "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary
to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling." 7 5 It emphasizes the affirmative obligation cities and
towns have to combat housing discrimination; it does not mandate
the balancing of housing rights of disabled persons against community self-interest.
Congress included the "reasonable accommodations" clause in
the FHAA because it recognized that something more than "even
handed treatment" was necessary to combat effectively the stereotyping and segregation of people with disabilities. By directly
establishing this additional technique for proving unlawful bias,
Congress chose to extend FHAA protections beyond traditional
notions of "equal opportunity." It recognized that positive steps
must be taken to meet the housing needs of people with disabilities.

27 6

The FHAA does not explicitly define "reasonable accommodations." It is clear, however, that the clause should be interpreted
like its predecessor, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.277 The House Report accompanying the passage of the
FHAA supports this interpretation, as does the preamble to HUD's
regulations enforcing the statute's provisions. In the House Report,
Congress states that the "reasonable accommodations" standard has
"a long history in regulations and case law dealing with discriminaLikewise, the Preamble to
tion on the basis of handicap." 28
HUD's FHAA regulations draws a connection between the meaning
of reasonable accommodations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the FHAA. 279 Both documents cite Southeastern
275

42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(3) (1988).

See Simring, supra note 83, at 427 (discussing the concept of "reasonable
accommodations" and the need for individualization).
'- Pub. L. No. 94-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
278 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 83, at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186.
279 See 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3249 (1989) (stating that the "concept of 'reasonable
2"
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Community College v. Davis, the leading case interpreting section
504.280

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplates that
the needs of people with disabilities be accommodated. This obligation can only be limited if doing so imposes undue financial or
administrative burdens upon the party to whom the request is made.
Although "fundamental" and "substantial" changes are not required
under this standard, many modifications are.28 When this requirement is applied to the FHAA, it clearly means that local zoning
boards must sometimes overlook limitations on the maximum
number of unrelated persons who may reside together and bypass
special permitting requirements. Communities have a clear duty to
eliminate zoning restrictions that exclude otherwise acceptable
group homes from single-family residential neighborhoods. 28 2
"[S]trict adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding
handicapped individuals from residing in the residence was
precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing Amendments
Act sought to overcome with the enactment of § 3604(f)(3)(B)."28 3
Canons of statutory construction and notions of public policy
bolster the argument for an affirmative obligation. As a remedial
statute, the FHAA must be interpreted generously and exemptions
to it read narrowly. 214 This canon was particularly significant in
accommodation' is ... used in regulations and case law interpreting section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act").
442 U.S. 397 (1979) (involving a hearing-impaired woman who was denied
admission to a nursing degree program because she could not understand speech
without lipreading).
281 See Simring, supra note 83, at 431 n.102 (describing the distinctions among
affirmative action, "evenhandedness," and "reasonable accommodations" and
explaining reasonable accommodations as "an equal opportunity plus a little
something
more").
282
See, e.g., Oxford House v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179,1186 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
Because one of the purposes of the reasonable accommodations provision
is to address individual needs and respond to individual circumstances,
courts have held that municipalities must change, waive, or make exceptions
in their zoning rules to afford people with disabilities the same access to
housing as those who are without disabilities.

Id.
213

United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991);

see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416

(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the "reasonable accommodations" provision "imposes
an affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons").
28 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)
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28 5
in
the recent decision, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,
which the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not exempt
from FHAA coverage when they employ zoning ordinances that
limit the number of unrelated persons who may live together in
single-family residential neighborhoods.2 86 The Court recognized
the FHAA's "broad and inclusive" compass and stated that "gener2 7
ous construction" must guide judicial analysis of the FHAA. 1 It
also noted that the maximum-occupancy limitation is "an exception
to 'a general statement of policy' [that must be] sensibly read
'narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the
2
[policy].'" ss

Furthermore, it is not inappropriate for public interest to
influencejudicial decisionmaking. Congress has considered the Fair
29
Housing Act to be a policy "of the highest priority." 1 Congress
also has "directly endorsed Oxford House ... as an organization
worthy of public support because of its role in helping to stem the
290
Just as exempnational epidemic of alcohol and drug abuse."
tions to the FHAA must be interpreted narrowly, its remedial
provisions must be applied broadly.
Many courts continue to misunderstand this clear legislative
directive. Instead of construing the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision requirement, they interpret it as a reasonableness
standard. This is a distortion of the statute's plain meaning. "A
refusal to make.., accommodations" 21 1 is the language of actionit is not the language of degree.

(requiring a generous construction of the Fair Housing Act to achieve its purpose),
cited in CaliforniaMobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d. at 1415 (holding that "the
FHAA imposes an affirmative duty ... to reasonably accommodate the needs of
handicapped persons"); Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d. 975, 978-79 (1lth Cir.)
(noting that exemptions to a broad remedial statute must be read narrowly), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992), cited in City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg.
Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994), afj'd sub nom. City of Edmonds v.
Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach,
825 F. Supp. 1251, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that exemptions from the FHAA
must be "construed narrowly" (citing United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915
F.2d. 887, 883 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 205 (1991))).
285 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
286 See id. at 1782-83.
287 See id.
2

1Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)).

289 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
290 Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 465 (D.N.J.

1992).
1 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
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This decided error in interpretation has colored numerous cases
involving group homes for recovering substance abusers, particularly United States v. Village of Palatine.92 and Smith & Lee Associates
Rather than affording group homes the
v. City of Taylor.29"
under § 3604(f)(3)(B), the courts
provided
additional protection
have employed balancing tests that equated the interests of disabled
people with those of the community as a whole. In Palatine,the
result was to require Oxford House to submit to a process that was,
even in the court's eyes, probably discriminatory. 294 In Smith &
Lee Associates, it meant that even though "the handicapped may have
little choice but to live in a commercial home if they desire to live
in a residential neighborhood," the town was legally able to
295
completely exclude them.
Despite the judicial tendency to misconstrue the meaning of the
FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" clause, a few decisions have
favored the better approach. The most notable and accurate
interpretation of this provision can be found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in City of Edmonds v. Washington State Building
Code Council.296 Reasonable accommodations, the court contemplated, means more than a mere balancing of a municipality's right
to zone against the needs of people with disabilities. Instead, it
"imposes an affirmative duty" on towns and cities to facilitate the
housing of handicapped people in the community of their
choice.2 "7 This interpretation, the court noted, was especially
appropriate in view of congressional intent. "Courts must ask
whether.., a city has to alter neutral zoning policies to reasonably
If the
accommodate and integrate handicapped persons."298
answer is "yes," something more than facial neutrality may indeed
299
be necessary.

37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
s 13 F.3d 920 (6th Cir. 1993).

294 See supra notes 230-40 and accompanying text.

13 F.3d at 931.
' 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd sub nom. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
27 See id. at 805.
98 Id. at 806.
See id.
29
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B. Rethinking Definitions That Limit
Access to Group Homes
If they are to protect effectively the housing rights of recovering
substance abusers, courts must also give closer scrutiny to facially
neutral zoning ordinances that limit access to group homes. Local
limitations on the definition of single-family residential zones must
be more liberally construed. This obligation is not only consistent
with Congress's intent, but it is a component of the FHAA's
"reasonable accommodations" standard.
To achieve the goals of the FHAA and to protect recovering
substance abusers from discrimination, definitions of the "family"
should also be interpreted broadly. Frequently, local definitions of
single-family residential zones pose more stringent requirements on
groups of unrelated individuals than on those related by blood or
marriage."' These definitions operate to the clear disadvantage
of disabled people who seek to live in group homes. For many
disabled people, it is often not possible, because of their physical
impairments or emotional difficulties, to live with relatives."' 1
This circumstance is particularly true for many recovering alcoholics
or drug addicts, who are highly susceptible to relapse if they do not
live in a supportive, safe environment.3 0 2 Seeking such a place,
Oxford House has modeled itself around the concept of "family."
Each house is self-sufficient and self-run. Residents share responsibilities, focus on tolerance and respect, and live together in a
communal environment.0 3
Indeed, Oxford Houses and other
group homes that operate as functional families may be considered
304
families by operation of law in at least one state.

"o See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 455
(D.NJ. 1992) (describing a local ordinance in which a group of unrelated individuals
were presumed not to constitute a family until they met a "permanency and stability"
standard, whereas related individuals were automatically granted family status); see
also Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1993) (imposing
a distinction between commercial and nonprofit group homes).
s"' See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs., 13 F.3d. at 920-22 (describing the program's
residents as elderly and disabled, often suffering from Alzheimer's disease and related
ailments).
' See, e.g., Township of Cheny Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 457 n.13 (describing what
would happen if Oxford House were to close).
0'See MOLLOY, supra note 4, app. B.
"o See Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 537 N.E.2d 619,619 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
the definition of the term "family" contained in the zoning ordinance of the Town of
Brookhaven violated the due process clause of the New York Constitution because the
definition excluded from its scope the type of "surrogate" families that reside in

THE FHAA AND GROUP HOMES

To facilitate the recovery of substance abusers, an inclusive
definition of "family" is necessary. A definition that includes selfsupported, democratically operated group homes is not nearly as
radical as it initially appears. Group homes for recovering substance abusers are not merely rooming houses. Residents of Oxford
Houses "share more than 'household responsibilities[,]' . . . [they]

make all house decisions in a democratic fashion ... [and] the
support they lend each other is therapeutic ... ."' They behave
like many families do, but lack the formality of filial allegiance.
Indeed, mental heath experts agree that it is appropriate to
characterize group homes as functional families.306 Like families,
members of group homes create "myths" based on group experiences that represent a sense of shared history, they develop specific
expectations of their community members, they form networks of
in-law type relationships, and they feel abandoned and disappointed
30 7
when a member fails or leaves.
The functional family, consisting of single parents, stepparents,
roommate situations, and homosexual and heterosexual cohabitation is sharply on the rise, while the traditional family is rapidly
becoming outdated."' Furthermore, the need to end discrimination has never been more apparent. Two states have recognized
this. The highest courts of New York and New Jersey have ruled
that municipalities may address only certain characteristics of the
traditional family in delineating acceptable single-family home
membership." 9 New Jersey courts, for example, use a "single
group homes).
" Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D.NJ.
1991).
' See Barbara L. Fenby, The Community Residence As a Family: In the Name of the
Father,5J. INDEPENDENT SOC. WORK 121, 123-24 (1991) (describing the family as the
pattern for community residences).
3o7 See id. at 124-28.
'08 See Note, LookingforaFamily Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach
to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991) (arguing that the
"traditional nuclear family is rapidly becoming an American anachronism"); see also
Gerald Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between
TraditionalFamily Life and IndividualAutonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 951, 952-53
(1989) (noting the increase in nontraditional family structures).
" See State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 375 & n.10 (N.J. 1979) (holding that an
ordinance that prohibited more than four unrelated persons from sharing a single
housing unit in the case of two nuclear families seeking to reside together partly for
religious reasons violates rights of privacy inherent in the due process clause of the
New Jersey Constitution); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1244
(N.Y. 1985) (invalidating a zoning rule that limited occupancy of single-family homes
to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption or to two unrelated persons
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rather than biological or legal
housekeeping unit" standard, 3 10
relationships, to define a family.
Except for two distinctions-that residents are not related to
each other and that they have acknowledged and are attempting to
overcome their addiction-how are Oxford House residents any
different than many families? To be certain, there are many
substance abusers who have yet to seek treatment and live in all
sorts of homes in all sorts of cities. Should not some accommodation be granted to those who have the courage to step forward and
attempt to heal themselves? In light of the FHAA's "reasonable
accommodations" provision, and in conjunction with Congress's
dual intentions of ending discrimination against people with
disabilities s1 and promoting drug and alcohol rehabilitation
through community integration,"32 it is clear that members of a
group home for recovering substance abusers should be permitted
to label themselves as a family.
C. Recognizing and Removing Subtle Barriers to Group Homes
for Recovering Substance Abusers
The FHAA certainly has its deficiencies, but it nevertheless has
had a substantial impact upon the way municipalities can keep
Judicial
unwanted populations out of their neighborhoods.
enforcement of the Act's provisions, although inadequate, now
keeps many cities and towns from enacting local ordinances that
directly exclude or have the effect of excluding group homes for
recovering substance abusers from single-family residential neighborhoods. Yet, despite these strides, communities have proven to
be extraordinarily adaptable. As quickly as courts invalidate one
exclusionary zoning tactic, communities devise another, more
insidious successor.

sixty-two years of age or older on the basis that the rule violates the due process
clause of the New York Constitution).
"'t See Baker, 405 A.2d at 372; see also Richards, supra note 192, at 790-91 (noting
that "[s]ome state courts ... in addition to striking down traditional-family
ordinances, have ruled that a local governing body may deal only with certain
characteristics of the traditional family in regulating the membership of household
units"); cf. Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 925, 92527 (employing a constitutional analysis of the changing nature of families in a time
of increasing challenges to civil liberties).
"' See supra notes 88-94 (discussing the purposes of the FHAA).
312 See supranotes 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988).
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The Supreme Court's decision in City ofEdmonds v. Oxford House,
Inc. and its respective fallout provides a fitting example of this
phenomenon. Before this case, maximum-occupancy limitations in
single-family residential neighborhoods had been a favored tool of
communities opposed to group homes." 3 Indeed, a substantial
part of their allure was that they did not appear as harsh as many
other discriminatory measures. Then, the Court held that this tactic
may violate the FHAA. 14 Although it is too early to draw certain
conclusions, it is not unlikely that the Edmonds decision will prompt
communities to develop newer, more sophisticated, less recognizable modes of discrimination. Such development has, in fact,
already begun.
In the Pittsburgh area, for example, local leaders could not
return to the drawing board fast enough. One suburban town
official who was in the midst of a zoning battle involving a group
home when the Supreme Court handed down the Edmonds decision
immediately recognized that he would have to change tactics.
Because numerical limitations could no longer permissibly bar
people with disabilities, he responded by planning to use space
requirements to limit group homes.3 15 In Pittsburgh proper, it
took the city council president and multiple neighborhood groups
less than a month to hold hearings and make new proposals capable
of skirting the FHAA and the Supreme Court's decision."1 6 A key
component of many of these provisions is a spacing requirement.
For instance, the Pittsburgh proposal includes one that restricts any
new facility from opening within 500 feet of another. 317 New
Jersey's Municipal Land Use Law suggests, among other things, that
no community residence be located within 1500 feet of another.1 8
ss See J. Kenneth Evans, Ruling Puts Group Home Laws in Question, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, May 31, 1995, at NI (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in
Edmonds had sent "municipalities across the country scurrying to rewrite zoning
ordinances"). For instance, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, a local official
estimated that more than half of the region's communities employed these types of

ordinances. See id.
s See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995).
s See Evans, supra note 313, at N1 (describing how the City Solicitor may employ
tactics that avoid altogether the maximum-occupancy limit standard).
S6 See Gary Rotstein, City Airs Plansfor New Rules on Group Homes, PITTSBURGH

POST-GAZETTE, June 14, 1995, at B5 (describing how neighborhood groups are

looking forward to this process to strengthen, rather than to liberalize, restrictions
against group homes).
S17 See id.
318

See N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40:55D-66.1 (West 1991); see also David P. Lazarus &

Susan DiMaria, HousingDiscriminationand the Disabled, 170 N.J. LAW. 20, 23 (1995)
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Another popular technique to block group homes is the use of
variance hearings and extensive conditional-use permitting processes. s 19 Like maximum-occupancy limits on the number of
unrelated persons who may live in single-family residential neighborhoods, such requirements for public notice and comment too
frequently disguise discrimination against recovering substance
abusers under facially neutral rules. Unlike maximum-occupancy
limits, courts do not uniformly find them to be illegal. Thus, while
group homes may have won one battle, they still run the risk of
losing the war.
Cities and towns are likely step up their efforts to employ
hearing and notice requirements in situations involving group
homes for recovering substance abusers. They may do so to
substitute for the loss of their other favorite technique-the
maximum-occupancy limit. They may be further encouraged as
people living in residential communities demand increasing
320
amounts of information about who their neighbors are.
Neighborhoods also may step up their protests against group
homes by asserting their rights to free speech. 321 Indeed, four
Senators recently introduced the Fair Housing Reform and Freedom
of Speech Act of 1995.322 This proposal, in part, seeks to tie the
hands of HUD officials who are trying to protect the housing rights
of disabled persons and keep residents from intimidating prospective group home occupants. 23 Not surprisingly, the other component of the bill seeks to overturn Edmonds and reestablish a
municipality's right to employ maximum-occupancy limitations free

(surveying the systematic and pervasive legal barriers disguised as neutral zoning
ordinances that exclude community residences).
319
See supra part III.B.2.

so See Tracy L. Silva, Comment, Dial "1-900-Pervert"and Other Statutory Measures
That Provide PublicNotificationof Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REv. 1961, 1968-79 (1995)
(surveying federal and state statutes and initiatives, as well as relevant court
decisions); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of
neighbor notification statutes).
"21
See James H. Andrews, U.S. Housing Agency to Issue Guidelines ProtectingFree
Speech in Bias Problems, CHRISTIAN SCI.

MONITOR,

Sept. 1, 1994, at 3 (discussing

changing HUD policy regarding the free speech rights of community members who
protest against plans to place group homes in their neighborhoods and describing
recent controversies regarding the First Amendment and the FHAA in Berkeley,

California and New York City).
32 See S. 1132, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S12,079 (daily ed.
Aug. 9, 1995).
"2 See S. 1132, supra note 322, § 2(b).
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from FHAA obligations and to protect them as a way to keep group
324
homes out of single-family neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION

When communities oppose group homes for recovering substance abusers, and when the judiciary allows this to happen, the
consequences are severe and unfortunate. Not only does such
resistance perpetuate unfounded and unacceptable biases, but it
hinders recovery from drug and alcohol addiction. Single-family
zoning ordinances that exclude recovery houses are detrimental
both to people who have such disabilities and to the general welfare.
Group homes serving former drug addicts and alcoholics
function best when they are located in safe, stable, residential
neighborhoods. Yet, these communities are the ones that mount
the most pervasive and, indeed, most effective opposition to such
programs. When local resistance successfully prevents recovery
houses from being established, people are kept from participating
in one of the most effective, least expensive methods of drug
rehabilitation. Furthermore, when single-family zoning laws exclude
group homes, these programs are forced to locate in neighborhoods
that are far less appropriate.
The "not in my backyard" attitude harms not only people with
disabilities, but places additional burdens on those communities that
3 25 Most frequently, these
are not capable of mounting opposition.
are poor communities that are already saturated with similar
programs and are least able to provide the kind of environment
recovering substance abusers require. 2 6 The upshot is an increasS2 See id. § 2(a).

My bill would clarify that localities can continue to zone certain areas as
single family neighborhoods, by limiting the number of unrelated occupants
living together. In my opinion, I think families should be able to live in
neighborhoods without the threat that groups homes-unsuitable for single
family neighborhoods-can move in next door and receive the protection of

the Fair Housing Act.
141 CONG. REC., supra note 322, at S12,079 (statement of Sen. Faircloth).
'"

Cf Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 520

(1994) ("If... minority groups are unable to find housing in more affluent neighborhoods in the city or in the suburbs, they may be more likely to remain in urban

ghettos, where drug addiction, violence, and other social ...
concentrated.").
-26 See Margulies, supra note 186, at 962-63.

ills are heavily

Poor communities' lack of access to this repertoire of resistance reinforces
market tendencies to concentrate human service facilities in low-income
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ing spiral of addiction and crime. The communities used as
dumping grounds are spread even thinner, and the people are
forced into neighborhoods where there is a far greater likelihood of
relapse.
The conflict between municipal zoning codes and group homes
for former substance abusers raises not only issues of individual
rights and local power, but it also challenges the national commitment to drug and alcohol rehabilitation. Americans say they want
to win the War on Drugs. But unless addicts are given the chance
to recover, there is little doubt that they will end up back on the
streets, committing crimes, remaining outside productive society,
and buying drugs.

neighborhoods. It is cheaper to locate human services in neighborhoods
where real estate is less valuable, rather than using "prime" land crying out
for luxury condominiums. Ironically, communities used as "dumping
grounds" tend to have fragile support systems which are least able to meet
the needs of citizens receiving services.
Id. Indeed, concerns regarding community saturation by group homes are raised with
increasing frequency. See, e.g., Ruben Castaneda, DrugProgram,Zoning Rules Collide:
D.C. Decision Threatens GroupHomesfor Recovering Addicts, WASH. POST, May 4, 1993,
at BI (discussing complaints in one Washington, D.C. neighborhood of being
"overburdened with shelters for the homeless, group homes forjuvenile delinquents
and unwed mothers, and similar facilities").

